Friday, June 27, 2008

JAMAICA – COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING ASSESSMENT

JAMAICA – Community-based Policing ASSESSMENT


MARCH 2008
This report was produced for the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ACP John Mclean of the Jamaica Constabulary Force; Professor Anthony Harriott/University of the West Indies; Dr. Elizabeth Ward/Violence Prevention Alliance; Police Specialist John Buchanan/USAID; and Roopa Karia/Latin America & Caribbean Bureau, USAID.

Contents

Acronyms......................................................................................................................................... ii
I. Introduction and Historic Background....................................................................................... 1
Assessment Objectives......................................................................................................... 1
Community-Based Policing.................................................................................................. 1
Historic Background............................................................................................................. 2
II. Executive Summary.................................................................................................................. 4
III. Analysis of CBP: Community Relations.................................................................................. 7
& Lessons Learned in Grants Pen..................................................................................................... 7
The Successes and Failures of CBP in Grants Pen................................................................ 9
Sustainability and Replication of The Grants Pen CBP Model............................................ 20
IV. Jamaica Constabulary Force Analysis..................................................................................... 23
Lessons Learned................................................................................................................. 23
Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 23
Jamaican Experience with CBP.......................................................................................... 24
The JCF and Community Policing...................................................................................... 27
Programmes Complementary to Community Policing......................................................... 31
Recommendations: Opportunities for the COMET Project to support the JCF.................... 34
V. Monitoring and Evaluation of CBP....................................................................................... 37
Lessons Learned................................................................................................................. 37
Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 37
Measuring CBP Progress and Success................................................................................. 41
ANNEXES..................................................................................................................................... 44
Annex I: Coordination with Donors and the Private Sector................................................ 44
Annex II: Individuals and Organizations Consulted........................................................... 47
Annex III: Literature Review.............................................................................................. 49
Annex IV: Community Based Policing Baseline Assessment.............................................. 50
Annex V: CBP Lessons Learned Matrix............................................................................. 53
Annex VI: Recommendations Matrix................................................................................. 56
Annex VII: CBP Assessment Terms of Reference.............................................................. 58

Acronyms

ACP Assistant Commissioner of Police (JCF)
AMCHAM American Chamber of Commerce
CBO Community-Based Organization
CBP Community-Based Policing*
CP Community Policing*
CPI Community Policing Initiative (pilot CBP project implemented by PERF)
CSP Community Security Plan
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
EU European Union
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GoJ Government of Jamaica
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
JASPEV Jamaica Social Policy Evaluation
JCF Jamaica Constabulary Force
KRC Kingston Restoration Company
MSI Management Systems International
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
PERF Police Executive Research Forum
PMI Peace Management Initiative
POC Police Oversight Committee
PPP Peace and Prosperity Project (implemented by KRC)
SDC Social Development Commission
USAID United States Agency for International Development

* Please note these terms are used interchangeably throughout the report.

I. Introduction and Historic Background


Assessment Objectives

Following on from a USAID Jamaica workshop in December 2007 it was agreed to carry out a review and assessment of community based policing (CBP) in Jamaica. This was undertaken by a five-person team, experienced in the area, which carried out a literature review and conducted field work over a two-week period in January/February 2008.

The purpose of the assessment was to determine next steps for mainstreaming the Grants Pen CBP experience and identify the technical assistance needs of the Jamaica Constabulary Force’s (JCF) roll out of CBP in Jamaica.

The assessment articulates the key lessons that can be drawn from the Grants Pen experience to benefit future CBP implementation in Jamaica and indicates how best to scale-up and mainstream the community policing activities in Grants Pen.

The assessment defines USAID’s role in supporting these efforts, primarily through the existing USAID Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET). The recommendations of this assessment take into account the resources available to USAID/Jamaica as well as political will and support for CBP.


Community-Based Policing

Throughout this assessment, the terms community-based policing and community policing are used interchangeably.

For USAID, community-based policing is an approach to policing based on the concept that crime can be most effectively addressed through partnership between the police and the community they serve. When put into practice, this approach to policing is generally characterized by consultation by the police with communities, adaptation of police policies and strategies to meet the requirements of specific communities, mobilization of the public to work with police to prevent crime, and adoption of a mutual problem-solving methodology as the fundamental strategy of policing.

The JCF similarly defines CBP as a philosophy and an organizational strategy based on the premise that the citizens of a country deserve an input in the police process, in exchange for their participation and support.


Historic Background

Within the JCF, a move towards community-based policing has been espoused policy for over 10 years. This is documented most recently in the JCF’s 2005 - 2008 Strategic Plan. The JCF has supported CBP in communities in the past, for example, the Gold Street CBP experiment in 1996.

USAID has supported the development of community policing for the past five years, particularly in Grants Pen, and has examined how to replicate aspects of community policing in other areas. More recently, this has changed to a strategic approach to supporting the JCF in developing community policing across Jamaica, rather than in a few pilot sites.

Relevant USAID Programmes
Since 2000, USAID has supported activities in inner-city communities in Kingston, activities that were complemented by other USAID-supported civil society strengthening and court improvement programmes.

The USAID Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP) worked to increase employment and entrepreneurship and improve conflict resolution in the Kingston communities of Grants Pen and Standpipe. The programme was implemented by the Kingston Restoration Company (KRC) from 2002 to 2004, with a number of Jamaican organizations as subcontractors.

To improve community safety in Grants Pen, USAID signed a cooperative agreement with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) from October 2002 to September 2005. The Community Policing Initiative (CPI) supported JCF efforts to implement community policing in Grants Pen. A study of violent crime and murder reduction in Kingston, commissioned by the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) in Jamaica and written by PERF, helped guide the design of the activity in Grants Pen.

PERF provided training to police and citizens, community outreach, and public education. In addition, the Jamaican private sector, led by AMCHAM, built a model police station in Grants Pen. The Grants Pen station houses several private businesses, including an Internet café and a Paymaster outlet, and a community health center is adjacent to the station. Further information on this project is detailed in Section III.

While the CPI pilot was being implemented, USAID was simultaneously supporting a complementary civil society strengthening programme, CIV JAM, to help national-level NGOs in Jamaica become more active participants in national governance and more effective public advocates. In addition, to improve the ability of courts to resolve cases in a timely fashion USAID supported an effort to automate and expedite court proceedings in the Resident Magistrate Courts.

In Grants Pen, this activity was followed by the USAID Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET). COMET builds on the PPP, implemented by KRC, and the Community Policing Initiative, implemented by PERF. COMET is working with residents, the GoJ, the JCF, church groups, CBOs, and other organizations to come up with solutions to crime and violence in Grants Pen and two other communities. COMET is engaged in five main activities:
Assistance to the Jamaica Constabulary Force and residents to implement effective community policing programmes;
Encouraging community groups to partner with the police and other organizations;
Increasing citizen participation in the community transformation process;
Assisting key community groups to become financially self-reliant and more effective; ,
Ensuring “ownership” of community activities by residents and local groups.

II. Executive Summary

This assessment follows on from a stakeholders’ workshop convened by USAID and held on December 11 2007. This workshop was significant in making efforts to deal with the differences of opinion about Grants Pen in a way that was constructive, action-orientated and forward looking. This report seeks to continue to move this process forward by identifying lessons learned and making recommendations for progressing CBP in Grants Pen and throughout Jamaica..

Personal safety is a primary concern for many Jamaicans and reducing the country’s high rates of violent crime has been and continues to be a challenge for the Government of Jamaica and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). For the past ten years, community-based policing (CBP) has been an espoused policy of the JCF with several past attempts at implementation. Lessons from these previous programmes have been included in this assessment. While past CBP reforms have typically not been sustained, they do provide a platform for the country-wide CBP expansion that is now a major priority for the new JCF Commissioner of Police. Currently, the JCF is working to roll out CBP more widely throughout the country.

USAID has supported community policing in Kingston, and specifically in Grants Pen, for the past five years: through the 2002-05 CBP pilot activity, the Community Policing Initiative (CPI), implemented by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and through the current Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET), implemented by Management Systems International (MSI).

The CBP model piloted in Grants Pen under the CPI was part of a larger strategy by USAID and its partners. The intent was to apply the lessons learned and best practices from the Grants Pen pilot to assist in the JCF’s roll out of community policing island-wide. Some basic elements of CBP were introduced in Grants Pen and the pilot succeeded in having an impact, albeit temporary, on the community-police relationship.

The assessment team found that Grants Pen is not a “model” either in terms of success or replicability but that there are valuable lessons to be learned which can assist with the ongoing development of CBP throughout Jamaica. The invaluable work of the private sector in supporting CBP in Grants Pen is particularly note worthy although there are lessons to be learned regarding roles and responsibilities.

While CBP has been attempted in various forms and at various times in the history of Jamaican policing there has never been a significant, sustained implementation programme. A number of factors have been identified to be addressed to make such an implementation of CBP more effective. These include leadership and accountability within the JCF; effective partnership working; clear policy support direction; enhanced corporate communications and increased organizational capacity. Nonetheless, while there are inhibitors to change various circumstances referenced in the report suggest that the time is opportune to progress the implementation of CBP in Jamaica. In this respect, the roles of the international donor community and the private sector are significant.

This assessment recommends that USAID expands its work on community policing and supports the implementation of CBP within the JCF in several ways, including developing its organizational capacity..

A consistent theme recognized by the team during field work was a shortage of resources that constrains the JCF in the most fundamental ways. We recognize that good policing can be expensive. However, good policing is essential to improving the livelihoods of all citizens. As a result, we wish to stress the need for consistently greater resource allocation and accountability on the part of the Government of Jamaica for the JCF. Good intentions and plans are important; resources are critical. The coordinated and focused support of the business community and international donor community in providing resources for the development of CBP has proved important in the past and will be even more so in the future.

Any further community policing efforts by USAID or the JCF must be accompanied by effective monitoring and evaluation (Section V and Annex IV and V), which will serve as the foundation for increasing the effectiveness and the impact of any programme and by close coordination and collaboration, not only with donors but also the private sector, which has resources and skills to contribute to community policing, crime prevention, and community development.

The assessment team recognizes the difficulty associated with measuring many of the aspects of programme performance in the police environment. However, if initial monitoring and evaluation is designed with focus and simplicity, the utility of the initial results will encourage follow up and further refinement.

From a more general perspective, the assessment team believes that while there are likely those in Jamaica who would not support improving police performance, there are a number of factors currently present that do support reform. The new JCF Commissioner has publicly made CBP a top priority. In general, the public supports improved policing, as does the private sector. DFID is conducting a complementary modernization project in both the Ministry of National Security and the JCF, which the USG should encourage to continue beyond its scheduled summer 2008 end date. EU budget support can be used by the GoJ to support the implementation of GoJ policies related to security (including community policing). Lastly, the current USAID COMET project provides a ready mechanism for supporting reform in the JCF.

The team agrees that the goals of reform are not in question. That the JCF knows the goals is also not in doubt. How change is to be implemented and accomplished is the primary obstacle.

The state of the JCF as an institution presents the most significant challenge. In theory, control of the operational philosophy rests with management. In practice, however, if supervision, process, structure, policy, implementation, accountability, leadership, and all the other components of an effective organization are inadequate, effective management of even routine operations is a significant problem. These daily obstacles are even more daunting when sustained operational reform is the goal.

When functioning properly, the foundation of institutional management provides sufficient leverage for change to be accomplished. The JCF foundation is in serious need of rebuilding which can best be accomplished from the inside while taking advantage of support from the outside.

Part three of this report contains an analysis of CBP particularly in relation to Grants Pen. Part four of the report examines, in particular, the experience the JCF has had with CBP and looks at current organizational impediments to change and makes proposals for overcoming these. Part five highlight the importance of monitoring and evaluation.

In addition, Annex I identifies the key roles for the international donor community and private sector in Jamaica; Annex II details the individuals and organizations consulted during the assessments and Annex III sets out the literature review. Annex IV and V are relevant to the monitoring and evaluation recommendations.

The assessment team found there is significant experience to draw on in progressing CBP in Jamaica. While there are many hurdles and barriers to be overcome a significant momentum has been gathered which, with the support of USAID and other partners, should overcome these.

For ease of reference, two matrices have been prepared which detail the lessons learned and the recommendations of the assessment team; these are attached as Annexes VI and VII.


III. Analysis of CBP: Community Relations
& Lessons Learned in Grants Pen

This section of the report examines the CPI pilot project in Grants Pen to understand what did and did not take place there in terms of CBP. It looks then to the application of lessons learned to Grants Pen and the wider development of CBP in Jamaica.

Lessons Learned:

Grants Pen is not a “model” in terms of success or replicability.
Grants Pen is a good example of private sector commitment to CBP.
Good preparatory work was done and some elements of CBP were attempted in Grants Pen, however core values of service, participation and accountability were absent..
Grants Pen provides valuable information and lessons
Decentralization, normally a component of successful community policing efforts, was viewed by some at least as going too far in the Grants Pen experiment. Stakeholders influence over management decisions was seen as subverting the normal JCF channels.
The role of stakeholders in the JCF’s future community policing efforts must be clearly defined and new lines of authority only created with the JCF and in accordance with standard management practices.
Unless specialized, central police units are properly trained and supervised closely, their standard tactics will damage positive police-community relationships and alienate the community. Community policing style and tactics are not just for some officers. The entire JCF must apply them. Specialized teams and task forces can implement community policing tactics also.
Trust- building is a difficult process that requires consistent effort on the part of the police to effectively manage the problem of corruption and to reliably protect citizens from criminal victimization. CBP projects should be accompanied by the development of dedicated channels by which the citizens in each community are able to help control corruption in the local police that serve them.
New personalities that bring a new policing style to a neighbourhood will have a window of trust building opportunity. The new style must persist for some time (three years is recommended) before old frames of reference are broken and a new model of police behaviour is created.
Some gains have been made in creating a new relationship between police and citizens. In order to consolidate this progress, citizens must move from partnership into problem solving.
Peace-making in violent neighbourhoods is progress. However it does not remove or weaken criminal groups and, in some instances, may strengthen them. Peace- making can create operational space for social crime prevention but does not mean that neighbourhood crime has been successfully controlled.
From the perspective of policing, transformation should include the following at a minimum:
· Altering the structure of criminal offending in the community from a high violence pattern to a more “normal” pattern
· Ending the existence of political and gang-enforced borders within the Grants Pen communities
· Breaking or at least eroding the code of silence in the communities and normalizing the reporting of crimes to the police
· Ending citizen vigilantism and the informal systems that have been erected to deal with crime in the communities and which are managed by local gunmen
· Maintaining the above for at least a period of three years. An extended period of rupture is required for new patterns of behavior and thinking to emerge. The experience of past projects is that brief periods of change have occurred (at times for as much as two years), but thereafter the communities easily regress into the old patterns. Projects that are designed to rupture the existing patterns and to transform behavior have to be sustained for long enough periods before they may be scaled down without a return to the old ways. One cannot be exact about the minimum time that is required for transformation (in the limited ways that are described below), but experience suggests that if change can be maintained for at least three years, then perhaps new patterns are being formed which may now be sustained by lower levels of resource allocation and external support. The idea here is that given the nature of the crime problem, a brief period of crime reduction should not be taken as evidence of transformation and that project commitments should involve a minimum time commitment. This minimum is a matter of judgment and experimentation.
Care must be taken to ensure that a model is sustainable. Any model project should seek to adjust the requirements of the project to the larger realities. Innovative sustainable solutions must be the goal of any model project.
Distilling the experiences of Jamaica and other countries in the region is important to the successful roll out of CBP in Jamaica.

Recommendations:

CBP should be developed throughout Jamaica in an incremental way using innovation and creativity.

Manage expectations in Grants Pen by adjusting the requirements of the COMET project to the larger national realities (i.e. JCF management, resource constraints faced by the Jamaica state, etc.) and local capabilities in order to better ensure sustainability.

Continue to inform the communities of their role in the process and to include them in decision-making as appropriate for that role.

Where community leadership is weak, special efforts are needed to ensure the representation of the various demographic (age, gender, area) and political groups and interests. This begins with recognition of the representative leaders of the different community based organizations, but may not be limited to these. In this regards, the station commander is strongly urged to create and support a citizen's advisory board or group. This board or group should: Maintain relationships and build trust between the community and the police through a respectful and routine communication in a group setting to ensure that citizens and the community understand one another's expectations, limitations and roles while building partnerships to solve problems related to neighborhood order and safety. The Station Commander should not delegate this duty. (S)He should ensure that citizens of varied backgrounds and officers of all ranks attend and participate.


Develop training materials based on lessons learned and best practices in CBP and/or community involvement from the Jamaican experience (Gold Street, Flanker, Browns Town (Dunkirk), etc.) that can be used to mainstream CBP.

Accompany any further roll out of CBP with efforts to ensure that procedures or protocols governing the operation of specialized, central (i.e., non-Grants Pen) units in the communities are followed. These units must operate with the knowledge and consent of local commanders and an understanding of long term police-citizen relationship goals.

The Successes and Failures of CBP in Grants Pen

It is important to learn lessons from Grants Pen, both positive – things to be done elsewhere in developing CBP, and negative – things to be avoided in developing CBP in Jamaica. The December 11 2007 stakeholders’ workshop convened by USAID was a milestone in making efforts to deal with the differences of opinion about Grants Pen in a way that was constructive, action-orientated and forward thinking. The following analysis recognizes the many different view points held about Grants Pen which are difficult to reconcile.

Any assessment of the Grants Pen CPI pilot project that seeks to identify its successes and failures and to distil the lessons from this experience that might be applicable to similar projects in Jamaica ought to begin with an appreciation of the stated objectives of the project. This is a primary reference point for this assessment.

The three major strategic objectives of the project were described by PERF as follows:

Moving the JCF in a positive direction toward a proactive, decentralized model of community policing;
Reducing police fear of the community and community fear of the police; and,
Engaging community stakeholders as a catalyst for change in community development and crime reduction.

According to PERF, “activities implemented in support of these strategic objectives were to fall into three broad categories: 1) Development of a model police station/community facility in Grants Pen; 2) Development of the community’s relationship with police; 3) Development of police capacity to implement community policing.”

The objectives of the pilot project, therefore, included the elaboration of a CBP model as a part of a larger strategy for the transformation of the JCF (by changing its style, organizational structure, relationship with the citizenry, and by developing its capacity to implement CBP Force-wide). A second and related aspect involved community transformation. This is stated above as “community development” via active participation of the various stakeholders. Physical, social, and political transformation of the community is hinted at in the various reports and plans that were written by PERF. In these documents, the “Grants Pen model” appears to be viewed as part of a larger strategy for transforming the police and the communities. This vision (and plan) was bold and ambitious, but necessary, if sustained reduction in the rate of serious crimes were to be achieved in the Grants Pen community.

Grants Pen was promoted as an exercise in “model” building. This is the stated overarching goal. The CPI pilot project was expected to have a demonstrative effect on police reform and modernization and serve as a site of learning for the transfer of knowledge of a new approach to policing inner-city communities. It would exemplify new methods of work and new relationships with the community. Model, in this sense, entails a claim to success and portability or “replicability.”

The above goals are programmatic in nature. This is why sustainability and portability are such important tests of the worth of the pilot project. Project sustainability and integration with the general plans of the JCF were therefore critical to a later transition from being a project with a short, fixed life-span to a programme with indeterminate continuity.

The successes and failures are assessed with respect to the above goals of the project: the development of a “model” of CBP that is effective in urban high crime environments and which would positively influence the accumulation of support within the police and the society for change and a roll out of CBP; and the “transformation” of the community. The extent to which both objectives are achieved in sustainable and replicable ways is an important indicator of success or failure.

Development of the Model
The Grants Pen experiment has produced a highly celebrated police station. The office environment of the police is exceptionally good and the facility is shared with other private and state provided services and, in a limited way, with the community. It is, on these criteria, a model police station. If, however, this model station was intended to symbolize and signify a new style of policing and greater police accountability to the community, then this was not achieved. A model station has been produced, but a working model of CBP was not achieved.

The centerpiece of the Grants Pen model was intended to be CBP. This style of policing is, according to Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, “both a philosophy and organizational strategy that allows the police and community residents to work closely together in new ways to solve the problems of crime, fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighbourhood decay.” This represents a fundamental shift in ideas about policing as the end-state that is envisioned is not just low crime rates, but the transformation of communities. Of course, police cannot be responsible for transforming communities (many other actors, including the residents must contribute) but they can help create the conditions of neighbourhood safety that allow transformation to occur. CBP should therefore not be reduced to only the use of foot-patrols, more intensive, face-to-face, voluntary contact between police and citizens, and greater civility and mutual respect in the interaction during these encounters, although these are useful methods and outcomes. Its features include a shift from crime control to crime prevention and from case-solving to problem-solving. Problem-solving is based on partnerships with the communities that are served. These working partnerships help to develop mutual understanding and trust. Indeed, trust can help develop information that leads to both crime detection and prevention. They therefore help not just to make the people safe, but also make them feel safe, that is, reduce both crime and the fear of crime. Direct accountability of all the partners to the community is another cardinal feature of CBP. This accountability need not be anchored in legal authority, but should be properly structured and institutionalized. The core values of CBP therefore include service, participation, and accountability. In essence, it is a more democratically orientated style of policing.

The team found no evidence that the concept of CBP was ever fully developed and applied in Grants Pen. A senior police officer with command responsibilities for the area expressed this view in the following way: “I don’t believe that CBP was ever practiced in Grants Pen.” This concurs with the Assessment Team’s findings. However, considerable preparatory work was done and elements of CBP were attempted which may now provide valuable experiences and instruction to the JCF in any effort to roll out CBP nationally.

Traditional policing and what is correctly called “crime-fighting” is deeply entrenched in the JCF. There are constant pressures (internal and environmental) and incentives to revert to and retain this style of policing, which is seen as appropriate for high-violence environments, and for policing problematic sub-populations that need to be controlled. CBP is seen as incongruous with this environment and as a style that may even put the officer on the beat at risk. It is, however, seen as appropriate for low crime rural areas and suburban middle-class communities.

The significance of the Grants Pen experiment was therefore its attempt to confront these ideas and to show that CBP was applicable and could yield good results in high crime inner-city areas. It was not the first attempt to do this in Jamaica. An earlier attempt to do a similar thing had been made by the JCF in 1995-1996 in Central Kingston, a much tougher community. This was done with some success, but was not sustained. The Grants Pen experiment sought to reaffirm this possibility, but did not draw on the lessons from the previous experience.

Assessment of CBP Elements Attempted
As noted above, some of basic the elements of CBP were introduced in Grants Pen. These included decentralization as an organizational change within the JCF to support CBP; efforts to improve police-citizen relations and citizen participation; problem-solving and crime prevention approaches; and community transformation.

Decentralization and Internal Organizational Change
The development of a successful model of CBP requires that some internal policing conditions as well as community conditions be met. With respect to the internal policing conditions, this includes a structural arrangement that allows considerable scope for local decision-making.

Decentralization is an important component of CBP. The JCF is a national, highly centralized, organization that operates in a similarly centralized system of government. Put in historical context, decentralization represents a sharp break with the traditional ways of doing things in the JCF and requires a greater willingness to take responsibility and a high level of decision–making self-confidence at the local level. However, more recent conditions favour change as the JCF has already recognized the principle of divisional primacy, with the commanding officer of a division the key unit of command who can manage and drive change from the division level, including appropriately directing CBP activities.

According to some officers within the JCF, during the period of the CPI pilot project, Grants Pen had, in their opinion, gotten out of control. Stakeholders with financial power had improperly influenced policing matters to do with deployments, officer selection, and other operational decisions. In the process, the very principle of decentralization and divisional primacy was violated by these stakeholders going directly to the Commissioner and disregarding the authority of the divisional commander. The very principle on which CBP was to stand - divisional primacy - was subverted by the CPI pilot project itself. Use of these circuits of influence to get what some stakeholders wanted resulted in tensions with other community-based stakeholders and subverted the construction of sustainable structures and new norms of conduct that build trust. Situations such as these can create an atmosphere in which some may feel the need to reassert power in ways that obstruct positive change.

There is a lesson in this for the future roll out of CBP. It is not sufficient for stakeholders to be well-meaning, hard-working, and innovative; they must be educated about their role in the process and particularly in the development of new authoritative decentralized structures. As part of this work with stakeholders, the local Citizen Consultative Committees (including the Grants Pen Consultative Committee), which are made up of community and business leaders and other community residents, provide an important means to help the JCF link to the community to address community safety issues and improve communication and coordination.

The Community-Police Relationship
There is another aspect to the problem of the internal organizational changes that are needed in order to make CBP a success. It is the relationship between the local policing authority and national or central units that occasionally stage operations in the communities with CBP projects. There are concerns that the methods of these units tend to inflict considerable harm on local police-community relations and to undo the trust-building achievements of CBP. These problems are captured in the following anecdote. Recently a raid was conducted in the Grants Pen area by a unit from the Mobile Reserve. The purpose of the raid was to seize a number of illegal guns and to arrest the gunmen who owned them. No guns were found, but a number of young men were arrested. After the raid, the local commander discovered that its purpose was to do what he had already done. The gun had already been ‘recovered” and the suspects were in jail at the time of the raid.

The upshot of this and similar incidents is that such police operations are seen by the people as harassment. They are actually the outcomes of structural (organizational) failure: the failure of over-centralization that does not encourage or mandate communication with the local commander.[1] This is an old problem recognized during the Gold Street experiment in CBP in 1996. The lessons from that experience were clearly not used to inform the Grants Pen CPI pilot project. Any future roll out of CBP should be accompanied by efforts to ensure that existing and future JCF procedures and protocols governing the operations of central units in communities are followed. This is important if the efforts to develop good relations with the communities are to be free of unnecessary ruptures and reversals.

As noted above, an explicit goal of the CPI pilot project was “to reduce police fear of the community and community fear of the police.” The goal may be seen as a worthwhile end in itself, but is a condition of police-citizen partnerships and instrumental to the central goal of CBP, which is to reduce crime.

In order to succeed in a high violence environment, CBP must couple the crime prevention and control efforts of the police with the willingness of the citizens to achieve similar results. In the process, the police must resolve the difficult issues that trouble their relationships with the citizens in the communities of the urban poor. These issues include poor police service, disregard for citizen’s rights, disrespect and incivility, corruption, a mutual lack of trust, and an inability to protect those citizens who are willing to confront the crime problem. They thus include those conditions that are the outcomes of police fear of the communities (an abusive style of policing that disregards citizen rights) and which similarly induce fear of the police. The fears of both parties drive patterns of behaviour which in turn reinforces these fears.

The CBP experiment provided a stronger and permanent police presence in the community and therefore a greater capacity to protect the people. However, the deployment was disproportionate to Grants Pen’s size. For much of the pilot project period, there were approximately 70 police officers stationed in Grants Pen, a police to population ratio of 1:116. The national ratio is 1:300. At the strength of 70, the Grants Pen station, which serves some 8126 persons (2006 estimate) or some 0.3% of the Jamaican population, accounted for approximately 0.9% of the entire JCF. Given the national strength of the JCF, this deployment was politically and administratively unsustainable and has since been reduced to approximately 35 or 1:233, equivalent to 0.43% of the JCF.

This dramatic change in police density in the Grants Pen communities, even without changes in the style of policing, would have been expected to have some impact on the crime rate. Increased police strength along with positive changes in the nature of the relationship with the community may be expected to have an even greater impact. Citizens reported an initial improvement in the responsiveness of the police and greater civility and respect for them by the foot-patrols and other units of police officers. This was a first step toward reducing fear of the police and building trust.

Trust and confidence in the police is built on changes in police behaviour. As the police become a part of the community, as it becomes a part of a network of institutions that provide services to the community, and as its officers become a part of the community leadership that is formed from patterns of face-to-face interactions, both police and citizen are better able to rationally evaluate each other and to develop mutual trust and confidence as partners in crime prevention and control.

The pilot project began with all of the problems described above. An attempt was made to establish baseline data on the attitudes of the residents of the community to the police. Focus groups were established for this purpose with the outcome that, while good qualitative data were generated that described the major concerns of the people and the root causes of the distrust and lack of confidence in the police, there was a general lack of rigor in establishing these baseline data. No measurements were taken.

A report on the focus group discussions indicated a very low level of trust and considerable fear of the police. Impressionistic evidence and reports by some respondents suggest that there was an initial reduction in fear and improvement in trust, but this has been reversed. The most recent available data on this issue was produced by the Social Development Commission (a state agency). Focus group methodology was also used for these assessments. The data that was generated from this assessment indicate that the level of trust is currently very low and that the pilot project did not make any lasting impact on this problem. For example, on a scale of one to ten, the mean rating given by some 300 citizens of their trust of the police in the division was 2.

There are more objective (behavioural) indicators of trust and confidence such as the level of reporting of crimes to the police, but there has not been any change in these patterns. This contrasts with the earlier CBP experiment in Central Kingston (Gold Street) in 1996 when there were positive changes in reporting patterns with respect to selected crimes such as rape. Distrust of the police is a deep problem that could not have been resolved during the short life of the Grants Pen pilot project, but one would reasonably have expected some positive change. Citizens still report that they do not trust the police to act professionally on information that they may provide to them on criminals.

There are also related concerns regarding police reliability. Reliability is important to local partners who must take the risks that are involved in supporting and working with the police. Responsiveness to their policing needs is regarded by them as an important indicator of police reliability and dependability. During this assessment, a number of respondents complained that police response to violence tends to be deliberately slow and that this unresponsiveness is rooted in negative attitudes towards them. They claim that the attitude of the police to the violent young men in the community is “let them kill each other.” Therefore, it is implied that the police tend to take action after a series of homicides have been committed rather than immediately after triggering events that are likely to be followed by a series of killings and/or attempted killings. Greater anticipation and preventive action communicates a greater interest in the safety of the community and thus generates greater confidence in the police. The citizens do not believe that the police have delivered on the promised “proactivity” that should have been a feature of the Grants Pen model.

Trust in institutions is a national problem. Trust-building at the local level, as an aspect of CBP, is therefore unlikely to yield quick and irreversible results. A survey that was conducted in 2006 by the Centre for Leadership and Governance at the Mona campus of the UWI found that Jamaicans do not trust their government and state institutions. Some 85% reported that they did not trust “people in government” and less than 8% had “a lot of confidence in the police.” Trust-building therefore has to be tackled at the national level – especially in the police. Negative attitudes and mentalities that obstruct the development of trust are distributed widely in the Force and the country. Communities should not be treated as closed systems. Moreover, these attitudes are never confronted openly. Training in CBP should not be viewed as simply the transfer of expertise; it should be designed to also explore these types of issues.

Consistent with the data on the distrust of national institutions that was reported above, distrust of the police is easily extended to other pilot project partners - if the experience with these partners is negative. Thus the model station is seen by important community actors as being linked to agendas of the more powerful partners and as a symbol of their relative powerlessness.

Some lessons may be drawn from the attempts to improve police-citizen relations as a working relationship for more effective crime control. It would seem that regardless of how problematic the relations between the police and citizens were/are, the citizens tend to display a willingness to support new attempts to change the state of this relationship. This has very little to do with a commitment to forgiveness as a moral value. This openness is made possible because the problems are usually personalized; new personalities are invariably given a chance to effect change.

The negative aspect of this “lesson” is that any new window of opportunity may be easily and quickly closed if the new personalities bring with them the old patterns of behaviour. Interpretations of observable behaviour are framed by past experiences. The new must persist for some time before this frame is broken and negative conduct seen as unrepresentative of police behaviour and therefore of lesser consequence for police-citizen relations.

Behaviour patterns are more damaging when they are believed to be consistent with deeply held negative attitudes to the citizens that they ought to serve. An important lesson of the CBP experience is that if there are ingrained negative attitudes to the citizens, then their participation will not be valued, and their role in policing the community will be reduced to being the “eyes and ears” of the police, that is, the role of informants rather than problem-solvers and partners in community safety. The citizen-as-informant is the role assigned to them in traditional policing. It is support for case-solving and contrasts sharply with the citizen-as-participant in problem-solving. Promoting a meaningful participatory role for the citizens requires a commitment to the core values of CBP. The organizational arrangements to facilitate citizen’s participation as partners have already been established. What is needed is their increased involvement in problem-solving.




Problem-Solving and Crime Prevention
The litmus test of the success of CBP is the extent and nature of its impact on the crime rates. This is what distinguishes it from Community Relations. If there is little impact on the crime rates, then CBP will be seen as “social work,” as inappropriate for the high crime communities of Jamaica and a waste of police resources. The status of the community police officers within the police force and the degree of support for the concept therefore depends to a large measure on its crime control and prevention returns.

An objective of the CPI pilot project was to “engage stakeholders in crime prevention.” Where CBP is practiced, this may be done via problem-solving, and in Grants Pen, some attempt was actually made to do this. It was recognized that the main driver of the homicide problem in the communities of Grants Pen was gang violence. An attempt was made to approach this issue as a problem rather than as a set of violent incidents to be solved exclusively by traditional investigative work. Influential actors in the community including the churches and the police were able to broker a truce between the gangs. This truce lasted for over a year.

Truce-making is not exactly a policing response to criminal violence. It is at best a starting point for problem-solving, and may provide the conditions for tackling the social roots of the violence. Peace permitted social interventions that brought resources into the community and provided opportunities for training and job creation. Some of these interventions met with mixed success. The projects are of doubtful sustainability as the profits from them are consumed rather than invested in the growth of the micro-businesses. The crime prevention returns on them are therefore at best short-term. This is not a surprising outcome as this problem is not peculiar to Grants Pen. Current COMET project designers and managers should be able to address this problem.

The truce did not and could not weaken the power of the gangs. These groups were therefore able to negotiate the terms of the peace and to continue to manipulate violence to their advantage. For example, they are able to threaten the truce by “firing shots” and, by creating this threat, they are then able to demand money and “jobs.” Criminal methods are employed in negotiating peace. The killings have since resumed in Grants Pen as is evidenced by the dramatic increase in violent crimes in 2007.

Peace-making as a type of “problem-solving” was able to dramatically reduce the homicide and shooting rates in the communities as these crimes are mainly conflict crimes involving the gangs. In this respect, Grants Pen is quite similar to other communities that experienced similar reductions in the rates of these types of crime during the same period and which did not have CBP.

An important indicator of the state of the crime problem in the community (and the country) is the homicide rate. In 2006, after one year of CPI pilot project activity, the number of homicides that were committed in the project community declined from 15 incidents in 2005 (183 incidents per 100,000 citizens) to 3 incidents (37 per 100,000). Shootings similarly declined. Importantly, the number of homicides and shootings in Grants Pen as a proportion of all homicides and shootings in the larger St. Andrew North police division showed a significant decline during the CPI project period – from the previous low of 11% in 2004 to a new 10 year low of 5%. These latter data suggest that there was a distinctively positive development in Grants Pen relative to the rest of the Division.

Other categories of violent crimes, such as rape and robbery, exhibited marked increases indicating that the community has not experienced a generalized decline in serious crimes.[2] These are predatory crimes that would not have been affected by the truce. For example, while two years immediately prior to the beginning of the CPI pilot project in the community, the frequency of robberies ranged from 2 to 3 incidents, during the project (in 2006) this increased to 15 incidents.

There were also increases in the incidence of property crimes within the Grants Pen communities (see Table 1). Equally problematic for the communities is the incidence of property crimes that victimize the neighbouring communities of the middle strata, that is, the outwardly directed crimes. There are no available data on these crimes, but the perception of the respondents including one of the political representatives for the area is that this problem persists unabated with the consequence that the communities of Grants Pen are stigmatized as havens for criminals and middle class support for projects is therefore not as forthcoming as it may otherwise have been. According to one respondent, “the middle strata will give money in support of projects in Grants Pen, but are reluctant to give of their time and to be involved in projects that require their physical presence in the communities.”

As was the case in Grants Pen in the past, and in other communities, the reduction in violent crimes has been temporary. In 2007, every category of crime showed an increase in frequency counts and rates. In most instances, the counts were higher than those that had occurred prior to the pilot project. For example, relative to 2006, the number of homicides and shootings increased by approximately 4 and 13 times, respectively. In addition to the breaking of the truce, the community seems to have adjusted to the presence of the police and the “halo effect” that had been generated by the pilot project has largely evaporated.
Figure 1 National Crime Rate vs Rate for Grants Pen (incidents per 1000 citizens)


Table I. Reported Crime in Grants Pen 1996-2007 (frequency counts)

OFFENCE
YEARS
MURDER
SHOOTING
RAPE
C/ABUSE
ROBBERY
BREAKING
LARCENY
1996
14
22
3
2
13
11
4
1997
13
25
2
4
15
14
2
1998
12
20
0
0
0
0
1
1999
5
16
2
2
8
7
0
2000
11
7
3
1
2
0
0
2001
6
15
1
4
4
1
0
2002
9
8
2
2
9
2
0
2003
9
9
0
1
3
1
0
2004
7
6
3
1
2
0
1
2005
11
10
0
1
2
1
0
2006
3
3
2
5
15
8
1
2007
11
40
1
18
18
16
8
Source: JCF.

Sustainable change in the crime rate requires real changes in the style of policing. It also involves tackling the social roots of the problem and altering and perhaps even transforming the social environment.



Community Transformation
A major claim of CBP is that unlike the traditional reactive and case-solving policing, it is able to reverse community decay and help citizens reclaim communities plagued by high levels of violence. In a safer environment, CBP advocates say, crime prevention, citizen confidence and control, create an environment in which transformation can occur.

Community transformation begins with the transformation of the crime problem in these communities and the provision of reliable, rights-regarding, and effective policing. The physical transformation of these high-violence communities is impeded by the insecurity of land tenure and the reality that citizens may be forced by gang violence to flee their homes. For these reasons they do not sufficiently invest in improving their homes and the physical environment. Violent crime also induces disinvestment in communities as is the case in Grants Pen, and the migration of small businesses that provides services and opportunities.

Transforming the crime problem must mean at least the following:

· Altering the structure of criminal offending in the community from a high violence pattern to a more “normal’ pattern, that is, lowering the rate of violent crimes and changing the ratio of violent to property crimes such that the former are fewer than the latter. In Grants Pen this ratio is abnormal and has thus far been unaffected by the pilot project. In 2007, there were 117 reported incidents of violent crimes and 34 incidents of property crimes, that is, a ratio of 3:1. If the 24 cases of possession of illegal firearms and ammunition are included as violent crimes, then the ratio is 4:1. A reversal of this ratio whereby there are 4 property crimes for every violent crime would suggest that a transformation of the crime problem has occurred (if this is achieved by lowering the rate of violent crimes). This kind of bench-marking may be useful for any roll out of CBP.

· Ending the existence of political and gang-enforced borders within the Grants Pen communities.

· Breaking or at least eroding the code of silence in the communities and normalizing the reporting of crimes to the police.

· Ending citizen vigilantism and the informal systems that have been erected to deal with crime in the communities and which are managed by local gunmen.

· Maintaining the above for at a period of at least three years.

However, community transformation is still a distant goal in Grants Pen and a more coherent strategy is needed. Community policing can facilitate community transformation but the lead role lies with the community, whose task can be facilitated by donors and other organizations.




Sustainability and Replication of The Grants Pen CBP Model

If the Grants Pen model is to be worthwhile, it must demonstrate sustainability and readiness for replication within similar urban high violence communities.

Sustainability
A necessary but not sufficient condition for being a “model” is sustainability in the given conditions. In the Jamaican environment, sustainability rests, among other things, on low- cost and low-maintenance solutions, and the successful introduction and institutionalization of incentives for change. This includes incentives for all the partners in the project, but most of all for the police and the community. In this section, the discussion is restricted to incentives for the police.

A Low Cost or High Cost “Model”
The Grants Pen model is a high-cost model, casting doubt on its sustainability. The Grants Pen model cannot be reduced to the model station alone, though the station is a highly visible symbol of CBP in Grants Pen. It may be possible to properly maintain this station but its appeal as a model is much reduced by its high cost, which makes it unlikely to be replicated and sustained elsewhere. In other words, it is not regarded as a model, but rather as a uniquely Grants Pen approach.

The idea of a model station is a somewhat, but not altogether, new element in the attempts to introduce CBP in Jamaica. It may be worthwhile recalling that the Gold Street experiment also had a “model station” with good working conditions, a receptive staff, and a working formula for sustainable maintenance of the building. This was a much more modest project with fewer community policing officers and lower building maintenance costs. These were however insufficient conditions for the success and sustainability of CBP.

In the case of Grants Pen, the presence of business firms within the building introduces a new element that ensures the interest of these firms in maintaining the building. Moreover, they provide services and opportunities within the community. Unfortunately, these firms are viewed (by some of our respondents) as serving the neighbouring middle strata rather than the community. This shows that ownership of the pilot project by the community was never achieved and perhaps cannot be achieved if the community is not fully involved in the decision-making. Yet community ownership is a condition for the sustainability of the larger project.

The high police density during CPI pilot project also made it a high cost operation for the JCF. Such deployments and the attending high costs made the project unsustainable financially and politically. Equitable treatment of other subpopulations of the country would require an increase in the size of the Force that is beyond the resources of the country for the near future. It is difficult for political administrators to justify this level of disproportionate allocation of scarce security resources to the Grants Pen area. Apparent inequality (particularly class inequality) in the allocation of public safety resources is bad politics. It is therefore concluded that this is why the project is not politically sustainable.

Any model project should seek to adjust its requirements to the larger national realities. The political administration must be pushed to make the resource commitments that are necessary for the success of CBP, but these resources will be limited. The challenge is to find solutions that are within the limits of the country. This is what gives relevance and meaning to the word model. A model is an expression of innovative sustainable solutions. In this context, innovation must mean elaborating a system that works with a lower police density. Gold Street, for example, had only four CPOs. Their successes were based on how the four officers related to the community and they sought to compensate for the deficit in their numbers.

Sustainability rests to a large measure on the relationships with the community. If there are good problem-solving relationships, then reduced police presence may be possible after normalcy or a pacification of the community has been achieved.

Incentives and Sustainability
The greater the incentives for change (material and otherwise) the more sustainable a project will be, and the greater its influence on the larger change process in the JCF. In other words, incentives promote “buy-in” and change advocacy, that is, political sustainability; and in so doing, these incentives also create a demand for replication among police officers. The pilot project has brought better working conditions for the police in the form of a well appointed model station with all of the basic amenities and an aesthetically pleasing environment. Reform and CBP is therefore now associated with an improvement in their welfare. While there are clear benefits for the police at Grants Pen station, the impact of far superior working conditions on those in the organization that do not have such conditions cannot be underestimated and can create a morale problem.

Project replication becomes attractive if sustainability is achieved. Sustainability and the capacity to replicate the pilot project are linked to the generation of large enough numbers of change agents who are committed to CBP and the larger change or modernization process.

Replication
The Jamaican state may have the capacity to launch and manage local projects such as the Grants Pen model station, but its ability to replicate such a project in sufficiently large numbers of communities and to sustain them is doubtful.

CBP, as had been argued above, is labour intensive. In some situations, it requires larger numbers of police officers than traditional policing. In other situations, and we think Jamaica fits in this category, deploying officers in a manner that facilitates the community policing style while maintaining the capacity to respond to emergencies is a mandatory first step. The team recognizes the JCF’s resource constraints and advocates an incremental development of CBP while carefully reviewing the structure and the budget of the organization. In Jamaica, this could involve reengineering the deployment scheme and developing a workload management plan. Once those tasks are accomplished and the plans are effectively implemented for a period, an informed judgment can be made about the adequacy of the JCF’s authorized strength. This could place new budgetary demands on the government, however, and any replicable model must be based on a low resource principle. The new Commissioner of Police has proposed the introduction of mobile police stations, a good example of the kind of creative thinking that would permit replication and facilitate the roll out of CBP.

The problems that confront any effort to roll out CBP extend beyond those of limited resources. There is also the problem of profound distrust of state authority. This problem may be mitigated by partnerships with credible non-state actors and the development of mediating structures between the people and the police/state agencies. The Grants Pen experience suggests that community committees may play a useful mediating role and that Trusts could help to raise and manage donor funds for CBP.

As noted above, a condition for replication and roll out is the emergence of large numbers of change agents. If this condition is not met, then it is likely that CBP will be emptied of its content and closely approximate traditional policing. The training and education of those involved in CBP therefore ought to be training in support of change. It is training that is designed to produce change agents, that is, police officers with the knowledge, commitment, and moral standing within the Force to truly make the programme a success. The difficulty with this process is that often the trainees do not see the possibilities. As their training is informed mainly by North American experiences, doubt usually remains regarding the applicability of CBP to Jamaican inner-city conditions, and is largely seen as idealistic and unworkable This problem may be overcome by distilling the Jamaican experience including the experiences of the community policing officers who were involved in both the 1995 Gold Street and the 2006 CPI experiments and others who had achieved significant successes in Kingston’s high violence communities.

Distilling the experiences of Jamaica is important to the successful roll out of CBP in Jamaica. Other experiences in the region may be equally significant in dealing with the problem of its applicability. If USAID is committed to these programmes beyond Jamaica, then the production of instructional videos and other documentation that highlight developing country experiences may be a worthwhile investment. The implementation of CBP will continue to be an uphill climb if after more than two decades of CBP no clear claims may be made about its success in low resource, high violence environments. These reservations must be responded to and taken seriously.

The assessment team wants to emphasize that strengthening the JCF through community policing will require a new vision for resource allocation and accountability on the part of the Government of Jamaica. Planning for CBP requires a reliable and long term revenue stream to ensure sustainability.

IV. Jamaica Constabulary Force Analysis

This section of the report examines some of the experiences the JCF has had with CBP including inhibitors and motivators towards this style of policing. In particular, it identifies current organizational and structural impediments to change and makes proposals for overcoming these.

Lessons Learned

Dramatic improvements in police community relations can take root quickly once police – citizen attitudes have changed.
While there is evidence of CBP initiatives, these have tended to be limited with no widespread implementation.
There are leadership and accountability issues within the JCF which inhibit the ability to transform the organisation towards CBP.
CBP must work with other social interventions and community programmes to successfully address social problems.
Lack of clear policy support and direction is an issue to be addressed.
Lack of resources for CBP is a strong inhibitor of transformation to CBP.
The organizational capacity of the JCF must be significantly enhanced in order to deliver a modern CBP service.
Corporate communications, both internal and external, are essential to the effective implementation of CBP.

Recommendations

To strengthen the implementation of CBP within the JCF, this assessment recommends a two-track process.

· Organizational development to build basic capabilities, including discipline, supervision, accountability, financial management, and other fundamental components. (Track One).
· Development of operational capabilities needed to expand CBP and other policing tactics over the long-term, including in Grants Pen. (Track Two).

2. Create a CBP Implementation Team, chaired by the Assistant Commissioner Community Safety and Security, charged with the CBP expansion. Team members from the Ministry of National Security, the JCF, other relevant agencies including SDC and relevant donors.
3. The JCF should work in partnership with donor agencies and other social agencies to progress CBP.
4. JCF and the Ministry of National Security should provide clear policy guidelines to support the development of CBP.
5. JCF should implement an effective corporate communications strategy in support of CBP.
6. The JCF should develop a reform leaders’ programme, with support from other key stakeholders.
7. The lessons learned and best practices from the CPI experience should be mainstreamed into the roll out process. Future technical assistance to stations participating in the roll out, including Grants Pen, should be provided through the Divisions as per JCF policy. Technical assistance will include incorporation of a revised Station Manual into the CP Manual; training and advisory services.
8. The JCF should develop a communication strategy addressing external and internal needs, and an appropriate mechanism for its execution.

The JCF has been pursuing the concept of CBP for at least 10 years. The organization currently defines CBP as “a philosophy as well as an organizational strategy that is based on the premise that the citizens of a country deserve an input in the police process, in exchange for their participation and support.”[3] Previous studies, publications, and initiatives originating from within and outside the organization clearly identify the CBP philosophy as the preferred operating style for the JCF. To that end, the team identified the first stages of transition to a new policing style in two Jamaican neighbourhoods.
Jamaican Experience with CBP

Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk)
In the Flankers neighbourhood near Montego Bay, the JCF Mobile Reserve has, according to residents, made a dramatic difference by treating citizens with respect while drastically reducing violent crime. This has been done in just a few months time. The relationship has progressed to the point that a celebration for the Mobile Reserve was recently held at the Flankers Community Center. One focus group participant, a recognized community leader, even used the word “cute” to describe a JCF constable who had to sling his rifle to help a senior citizen. When compared to other descriptions of police conduct we heard, this is truly remarkable.

According to the focus group members, this reduction in crime is due almost exclusively to the change in tactics and attitude of the JCF Mobile Reserve. Both focus groups, a total of about 35 female and male residents of various ages, agreed that the Mobile Reserve (a part of the JCF usually known for its hard-edged tactics) had accomplished this by being visible and, most importantly, respectful in their communication with the residents. In response to open ended, probing inquiries, all the participants agreed that respect and communication were the top reasons for the Mobile Reserve’s success.

This is in stark contrast to the groups’ opinions regarding the police who are usually responsible for providing protection to the Flankers community (constables assigned to the various police stations in Montego Bay). Focus group members criticized them for their hostile attitude, disrespectful conduct, and failure to provide protection for residents.

While in the Flankers community, we contacted a few members of the JCF Mobile Reserve. The officers held the rank of constable and were young with only a few years of experience. The informal leader of the team said that they were aware of the Mobile Reserve reputation for aggressive tactics. He said that the training he has received in customer service and interpersonal skills have affected the way he approaches his job. He added that not everyone has received this training but his colleagues agree that using CBP tactics has been effective in Flankers. It is important to note that the constables assigned to Flankers from the Mobile Reserve apparently made the decision about how to approach the situation there somewhat on their own. There was no mention of supervisory or leader involvement in the choice of tactics, though we cannot say that there was no input from unit leadership.

Similar results were found in the community of Browns Town (Dunkirk). The assessment team conducted a focus group meeting with residents from that Kingston community and learned that the police had developed a significant presence and improved attitude. In conjunction with the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) community project, a change in the JCF policing style is credited with a significant reduction in violent crime. There were indications that this improvement has not penetrated the community beyond the violent crime arena. Residents implied that informal neighbourhood norms were now in place to help keep violence down. There were also signs that these informal norms may allow other types of illegal behaviour as long as violence or behaviour known to lead to violence was not involved. For example, we were told that cocaine was strictly forbidden in the area. Apparently, this was a decision taken by informal community leadership and it appears to have had an impact on the rate of violent crime. We were also told that the cooperation with police would generally not extend to reporting crimes or identifying suspects. Therefore, an informal partnership appears to have been established that has quelled violence but does not necessarily include or extend to crime reduction across the board. It is possible that this arrangement is a substitute for the “don system” in which a self appointed neighbourhood boss keeps the peace, enforces certain standards and controls crime and other activities.

Whether or not the situation in Flankers is a phase in an ongoing evolution of the police-community relationship or is a steady state is not known at this time. It is the opinion of the team that, while the reduction of violence is a most welcome development, the JCF should, at some point, continue to push the CBP agenda in order to encourage progress toward a more complete partnership with the citizenry. Unless citizens are willing to cooperate and participate more broadly, progress made will be built on shaky ground and the potential for backsliding into a more violent situation will always be there. It is the team’s opinion that a partnership marked by more active cooperation with the police in pursuit of a broader law abiding environment rather than the reliance on informal (and therefore unaccountable) structures to regulate citizen conduct is a worthwhile goal.

In both the instances cited above, isolated efforts by first responders (or in Flankers, the Mobile Reserve as a substitute for the normally assigned first responders) and community policing personnel have dramatically improved relationships with citizens in local neighbourhoods. Although there has not been a science-based evaluation, anecdotal evidence along with widespread agreement between residents and police support the idea that a major contributor to reduced levels of violence has been the change in the attitude and increased presence of police. Specifically, we were told that police presence along with communication and respect for citizens were the primary ingredients. These points were agreed upon by both the police officers and residents with whom we spoke.

Our conclusion is, therefore, that dramatic improvements in police-community relationships can take root over a relatively short time in small, troubled communities if police change their attitude. The existence of legitimate community leadership is an important factor in this improvement and provides a focal point for neighbourhood trust building. These developments are relatively recent and narrowly focused. However, they do provide some indication that violent crime reduction in some neighbourhoods could be linked to police conduct and technique. In addition, these improvements have occurred without the introduction of massive new programmes. It is not clear whether the relationships that have been developed in Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk) can withstand the jolt of disruptive incidents such as a questionable police use of force or a spike in criminal violence. It is also not clear what impact these new arrangements will have on police corruption.

It is clear, though, that the potential for limited community policing initiatives exists in the JCF. The term limited refers to the fact that although the relationships are improving, other CBP tactics such as partnerships and problem solving are not commonly referenced or observed. This is not to disparage the progress cited above. However, this does illustrate that the process of CBP implementation across Jamaica will be an evolutionary one requiring significant changes in management, policing style and community action. At this point, in Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk), the primary change has been in police attitude which is an excellent start. Other changes must be engineered if CBP is to be a reality.

The team believes that in spite of the above examples, CBP is not the current operating practice in Jamaica. The Grants Pen Model Station project and the Gold Street experiment are attempts at limited implementation. Other examples may currently exist in Jamaica as well. The fact that CBP has yet to progress beyond a few pockets is recognized by the JCF and as such the organization is currently beginning an island-wide expansion of the CBP philosophy and practice.

Grants Pen Pilot CBP Project
Perhaps the best known policing project in Jamaica is in the Grants Pen area of Kingston. Many of the details of the Grants Pen experience are discussed elsewhere in this assessment. Based on those details and other information developed during the course of this study, it is apparent that the JCF operation in Grants Pen has not met the expectations that were set for it early on.

Relationships, and the trust that is built on relationships over time are key. The new division commander has taken the initiative and assigned a new commander for the Grants Pen station. He has also removed the “Power Squad” that was apparently responsible for some of the relationship problems in the area.

The difficulties that have plagued the Grants Pen pilot are similar to the symptoms discussed elsewhere that have obstructed basic management of the JCF as well as the implementation of CBP over the last 10 years.

For example, constables that were trained in CBP were transferred from Grants Pen Station to other stations on a seemingly random basis. The original station commander held the rank of inspector which, it has been suggested, does not carry with it the authority needed for such an experimental project. Based on conversations with JCF officers, some Grants Pen police supervisors were not properly trained or were not qualified for the job. In a classic example of unintended consequences, constables working in the area, perhaps naively, perhaps not, came to know the criminals in the neighbourhood. These relationships became the subject of police bribery rumors and allegations. As in other JCF units, those members who may be honest themselves are too fearful to come forward about such incidents. Systems were not in place to deploy personnel to the maximum effect. It appears that basic station management tools, such as effective crime reporting protocols, may not have been effectively utilized

It must be pointed out that the types of problems cited above are not unique to Grants Pen. Indeed, these obstacles are present throughout the JCF and are responsible, to varying degrees, for the difficulty the organization is having instigating change that almost everyone inside and outside the JCF says should occur. These problems relate to the inability of the institution to make the right changes for the right reasons. Leadership, management, supervision, structure, process, policy, accountability, etc., are examples of the institutional foundation that is missing in the JCF and therefore, at Grants Pen.

The JCF and Community Policing

It is not surprising that the small signs of progress discussed above are occurring. Most Jamaicans view crime as a very serious problem. Community groups and the JCF have undertaken many initiatives over the last 10 years, sometimes with the assistance of international donors, to foster improved community relations, and identify reform goals and obstacles to attaining them. Primary among these identified goals has been the implementation of Community Policing. Although the understanding of the CBP concept varies, we encountered many, both inside and outside the JCF, who recognized the concept of CBP and responded positively to it. While the details might be a bit unclear to many, what does emerge is consensus that CBP is a superior method of service delivery and can help reduce crime. We also point out that CBP alone will not and cannot diminish the social ills such as lack of opportunity and low levels of education that contribute to criminal conduct.

The development of this consensus dates to at least 1998 and the publication of the JCF Corporate Strategy (five year plan). The plan endorsed CBP and identified a number of priorities for the JCF, including: building a Professional Workforce, Instilling Principles of Integrity and Restructuring and Resource Management. Pursuant to this plan several thousand officers were trained in community policing and crime investigation techniques. A Police-Citizens’ Charter was developed, The Code of Conduct for Police-Citizen Relations was written and distributed, and Ethics/Values Statements published. These documents contained many important principles supporting appropriate police conduct, good police management, and community-based concepts.

The 2005-2008 Corporate Strategy set out three major priorities: Providing Citizen Focused Service, Tackling Key Operational Issues, and Making the Best Use of Staff and Other Resources. Within each of these priorities, numerous goals and initiatives were presented. While it appears that the strategy has value for the JCF and progress has apparently been made on some plan areas, there are a number of areas (both included in the strategy and absent from it) that require serious improvement. It is not within the purview of this assessment to review the Corporate Strategy. However, it is important to note that there is some capacity within the JCF to undertake a planning process that, at a minimum, identifies and prioritizes what needs to be done. This conclusion is supported by interviews with knowledgeable people and documents we have received. There is no lack of knowledge relative to “what needs to be done” within the JCF to make it more community-based, efficient and effective. Rather, the team believes that the prime obstacle is the “how:” the implementation of reform and rebuilding.

This conclusion is supported by observations by a team member at a workshop attended by about 40 crime prevention officers from around Jamaica. The group developed and discussed a thorough list of challenges and solutions to problems they face in their work every day. The officers know what their role is supposed to be. Many of the frustrations presented relate to institutional themes. Lack of support from management, workload and deployment problems, uneven understanding of crime prevention and Community Policing, absence of trust between the police and the citizenry were all mentioned repeatedly. It was clear to the observer that this group could be a key factor in engineering change in the JCF. In order for them to achieve success and influence they, and the leadership of their divisions, need support.

Community Policing: Conditions, Constraints, and Support
Without a doubt the poor human rights record of the JCF (particularly the use of lethal force by security forces) is a significant driver for a move away from militaristic styles of policing to something more community-based. The focus of reform in the JCF has been and continues to be CBP and community safety. As can be seen above, small examples or components of the concept are evident in disparate places and circumstances. The new JCF Commissioner, who took up the post in December 2007, has made it very clear publicly and in a meeting with members of the assessment team that CBP is a major strategic priority for his organization. As discussed earlier, within the JCF a move towards CBP has been espoused policy for some 10 years, documented most recently in the 2005-08 Strategic Plan.

In the team’s view, one of the reasons that previous, well intended plans did not result in significant change relates to the state of the JCF as an institution. Experience demonstrates that acknowledgement that change is needed is a vital first step. However, moving an institution toward that change requires a much broader process involving skilled action across a number of fronts, which is further constrained by responsibility for policy in the JCF residing in the Ministry of National Security. Restructuring within the Ministry of National Security, to give it a greater focus on community safety and CBP, is presently ongoing but it is not clear if this will result in more resources being found for operationalizing the concept.

The creation of a CBP Implementation Team would be a valuable asset for direction, coordination and follow through. This team would be charged with supporting the ongoing CBP initiative directed by the ACP in Charge of Community Safety and Security. The Ministry of National Security would be a team member and along with others, including USAID would be required to facilitate implementation and adjust resources for support.

The constraints on change are similar in policing to those in other large organizations. There is a reluctance of members to embrace change. Reform efforts can be viewed as “just another short term programme,” more trouble than they are worth or risky to one’s career. Moreover, there is always the fear of altering the state of operations that members are accustomed to. Due to attempts to develop CBP in Jamaica over the last 10 years, the current effort can be seen by internal skeptics as another “flavor of the month” that can be waited out.

Resources are another typical constraint for any police institution seeking significant transformation. The JCF definitely faces some very basic resource and logistical problems and shortages. There are few law enforcement agencies in the world that do not routinely press for additional resources. However, as is illustrated in Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk), the first steps to successful CBP reform do not require substantial capital investment. Automation is not a precondition for a change in attitude. Keeping a police station clean relies as much on the conduct of those who use it as it does on the institution’s funding of a janitorial service. That is not to say that resources management is not a significant issue. Deployment strategies, use of civilians, efficient purchasing and inventory practices are just examples of processes that, when solidified, will help identify the JCF’s true resource needs.

Change engineering is a challenging art. A number of internal and external factors must line up if reform is to be achieved. The unique nature of law enforcement organizations; often insular, aloof and opaque can test even the most determined change initiatives.

Any discussion of constraints must include the corruption problem. Corruption causes serious dysfunction in any government enterprise and erodes efficiency and effectiveness while destroying public confidence. In Jamaica, the JCF has significant internal governance obstacles that hinder daily operations, relationships with the public and management control. Overall institutional health and success, regardless of the policing style used, requires effective internal controls and discipline.

In Jamaica, the “standard” internal obstacles seem to be in place. Externally, there are undoubtedly those who support the status quo. Their degree of influence is difficult to determine, as is the potential for eventually generating their support. In any case, we are aware of significant support for police reform in the business community, among the citizenry, and within the government.

Reform of the JCF
As indicated above, the task at hand centers on management of change by the JCF through execution by individuals and implementation by the organization. “No amount of external donor pressure or resources, by themselves, can produce sustained reform.”[4] The assessment team fully endorses the concept of host country “ownership” as an essential ingredient in the effort to achieve reform. It is the opinion of the team that there is potential for such ownership in Jamaica.

The early positive results we observed from the attitude shift among police in two areas of Jamaica were very encouraging. It is also important, though, that those improvements, as critical as they are for the communities involved, are not identified as CBP best practices. We do not intend to diminish the accomplishments in Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk), rather it is our belief that those success stories should be identified more as first steps and indicators of how conditions can begin to improve in a short time as the public reacts to changes in police behaviour.

Best practices in CBP certainly include a different police-citizen relationship as a major component. That component can be used as a building block for further progress to include the creation of partnerships and then problem-solving activities. These two cornerstones of CBP can be tools to help bring about greater neighbourhood safety. The relationships, the trust that they bring and the subsequent improvement in security, however, can be very fragile. Isolated police misconduct, random violence, personality conflicts, or disagreements over tactics and resource allocation can all test police-community trust. Other tactics that flow from the CBP philosophy can mitigate the likelihood of a permanent trust gap. Formal citizen involvement in some internal police processes, limited consultations on operations and outreach programming can inoculate the relationship, enhancing resistance to potentially debilitating events or personalities.

These and other pieces to the CBP puzzle must be seen as part of the eventual best practice agenda for the JCF. As implementation gathers momentum, the JCF will gain needed experience and can identify methods that work best for them.

The team wants to emphasize, however, that experience in Jamaica and elsewhere demonstrates that good intentions, training, planning documents, and public statements will not result in significant change in the way the JCF operates. The CBP philosophy is a significant change from the traditional role of the police in Jamaica. Most, if not all, police organizations that have successfully implemented this philosophy already had in place sufficient supervision, process, structure, leadership, management, financial, conduct and performance accountability, policy, and ability to implement (i.e., making the right things happen) at the time the change process began. These components do not guarantee successful change but when combined with skilled leadership, political will, and appropriate resources, transformation can occur. In policing, this shift to the CBP style has been an evolutionary process, not one occurring instantly.

It is the opinion of the team that while the JCF does not currently possess such a set of organizational capacities, conditions appear to be lining up in support of two parallel change tracks. While organizational capacity is not directly within the remit of the team, the following proposals are made in recognition of the fact that such organizational capacity is essential to the effective development of CBP. This is not to suggest this is the only way, or indeed the best way, for the JCF to increase organizational capacities.

First is a track for organizational development that involves building the basic capabilities any successful police organization must have. Areas of focus involve structure, discipline, supervision, accountability, financial management, personnel rules, and many other fundamental components. DFID modernization projects underway at the Ministry of National Security and at the JCF could provide leverage points for this process. The implementation involves the development of “Reform Leaders” who attack prioritized problems according to work plans they develop and own. USAID’S COMET project could provide support for this track. The ultimate goal is to develop enough reform leaders to tip the organization into reform status. More details are provided in the recommendation section of this part of the report.

The “second track,” already underway, relates to the development of the operational capabilities (i.e., on the streets) necessary to sustain and evolve CBP and other policing tactics over the longer term. The Ministry of National Security, the new JCF Commissioner, the business community, DFID, USAID, the Social Development Commission (the Jamaican government agency responsible for community development), and JCF personnel are showing through word and deed support for the CBP reform initiatives of the JCF. JCF planning has been rejuvenated by the arrival of new JCF Commissioner, Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin. The existing USAID COMET project can participate in this track in a number of ways. Some are discussed in the recommendations section of this part of the report.

Programmes Complementary to Community Policing

Communication and marketing are mandatory components of any successful institutional change process. In an effort to complement the “two tracks” discussed above, the following is provided as supplementary to facilitate the reform process.

Internal Communication
Long time employees of the JCF will recognize the rhetoric connected to CBP - they have seen it before. Action will be the key to convincing the members that “this time it is for real.” Leadership must be visible, consistent, and unrelenting. Any small example of good CBP practice must be noticed and celebrated. The word must go out that “if you want to advance your career, you must endorse and practice good leadership and the JCF Community Policing style.” Moreover, the concept of “what’s in it for me” must be addressed. The JCF must make the case to its own personnel that CBP makes sense for them as members. It can make their jobs more satisfying and rewarding and it is much easier to negotiate for a pay raise when you have high public approval ratings.

The JCF has used pamphlets and publications in the past to deliver its message. It may now be possible to use other modes, say DVD’s or a government cable channel, to personalize communication between the Commissioner and the organization. There is no substitute for hearing and seeing top leadership especially when the words are followed up with action. In addition, the communications strategy must facilitate direct communication between top leadership and command officers, supervisors and the line. The team recognizes that basic communications technology is a constraint to a large degree in the JCF infrastructure. Resources to address this problem must be allocated by the Government of Jamaica.

The messages delivered to each must be customized but follow the same theme. A hand must be extended to first line supervisors, in particular, as they tend to have little or no routine contact with senior leaders. They must be brought into the management team, inspired and when appropriate given the discretion to act. Without their support, changes necessary to accomplish the Commissioner’s goals will not be achieved. Bringing them on and keeping them in the fold is largely a function of internal communication and, to a lesser extent, training.

External Communication and Marketing
As noted above, action will be the hallmark of JCF reform. This is just as true in the external realm. It is the opinion of the team that the “message management” function for external consumption and internal use should reside in the same JCF unit. There are few more serious breeches of customer service than the charge of “this was not as advertised.” Putting the responsibility for internal and external communications in the same unit is one way to reduce the chance that internal mandates do not comport well with the behaviour the public sees. Employees must know what the public expects of them. Moreover, the public must know something about their rights and responsibilities. Only in this way will the internal and external expectations start to come closer together. The Code of Conduct for Police-Citizen Relations in Jamaica published in 2003 by the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the Intercity Development Committee is a good example of this concept.

There are many outreach possibilities. Everything from a speaker’s bureau to neighbourhood crime prevention meetings and school programmes are an opportunity to tell the story of the JCF. This is not an endorsement of spin or an emphasis on delivering only good news. Indeed, the unit must become adept at delivering both the good and the bad news internally and externally in a straight forward way. Anything less is courting disaster.

Community Programmes
In both Flankers and Browns Town (Dunkirk) there were active community programmes. The community center in Flankers provided a venue for adult classes such as parenting and a place for children to gather for constructive activities. In Browns Town (Dunkirk), the PMI programme established a forum for facilitating community efforts at violence reduction. It is well known that community policing will be more successful in places where there is some neighbourhood structure. Civil society groups and the JCF are aware of this. The JCF and the Social Development Commission (SDC) have recently entered into an agreement to facilitate the partnerships between the JCF and programmes sponsored by the SDC. The team endorses this approach.

Stakeholders – Roles and Responsibilities
As any organization begins to expand its list of potential partners, the issue of managing relationships with those partners becomes more important. Many parts of any community are going to be very interested in participating in the efforts surrounding the pursuit of safety and security. A donor or a host country entity may find it advantageous to create relationships with various host country organizations or individuals in an effort to broaden support, increase resources or add to the momentum for positive change.

A clear understanding of the roles of each entity is important. Sometimes these understandings should be formalized. Generally, the more complicated the program and the more money that is involved, the more likely that a document clarifying the basic roles and responsibilities should be written. For example, the understanding between a neighborhood group and the local police station about how and when to meet and who speaks for the neighborhood probably does not require a written document. On the other hand, success of a donor program involving public money may be facilitated by a letter agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding that clarifies the obligations and time lines for each party.

There are several different mechanisms that can facilitate partnerships in this context. All should be created with the understanding that those with authority should consider whether or not that authority should be retained or shared. Generally, those with the formal responsibility for results should have the ultimate authority, however, in the public service sector; it may not be possible to maintain independent authority in its pure form. Public safety agencies, for example have many constituencies to accommodate. In some instances, accommodation will not be possible (such as when a community, often without realizing it, asks a public safety agency to engage in unethical or even illegal conduct). It is, though, generally feasible to balance public input and interest with the legal, ethical and fiscal responsibilities of the public servant. Sometimes this balance comes with trial and error. In any case, the list below provides some examples.

The Steering Committee: This committee could be run like a board of directors and depending on the scope of responsibility, make decisions about project direction or scope. It could also make recommendations to the station commander, the district commander or project manager.

The Advisory Board: Typically more general in nature than the Steering Committee, this body can also review policy, develop its own recommendations to decision makers and be used as a communications net for a police command or a donor project. The board could represent a certain business community or neighborhood. A station might have more than one.

Individual Participation: Individuals from the community can participate (for clearly prescribed periods of time) in internal processes as members of review boards, discipline boards or even hiring and promotion boards. They should meet certain standards and bring community input into important decisions on a regular basis.

The “qualitative aspect of participation” by various stakeholders has been categorized by Brinkerhoff and Crosby.[5]
· Information Sharing: one way information flow
· Consultation: two way information flow
· Collaboration: joint activities in which the initiator invites other but retains authority
· Joint Decision Making: collaboration with shared control
· Empowerment: transfer of control

This list presents an easy reference for framing the management profile of a project or service that has a number of interested parties. It should be considered when designing the structure to facilitate communication, decision making processes and relationships related to providing law enforcement services or implementing donor programs.

Recommendations: Opportunities for the COMET Project to support the JCF

As discussed above, the current situation lends itself to a two track approach. It must be emphasized that these two tracks cannot be viewed in isolation. The concept relies on a leveraging effect in order to multiply the positive impact. In addition, the importance of organizational development must be understood. The only way to maximize the potential for long term change is to reform the JCF as an institution so it is capable of conceiving, planning, implementing and supporting daily operations while adapting for the future.

Track One: Organizational Development – Reform Leaders Project
In an effort to begin addressing some of the critical institutional problems that have prevented the implementation of CBP, a critical mass of leaders should be identified, trained and placed as part of repeating cycle. This concept is very similar to one mentioned by the Commissioner of the JCF in a meeting with assessment team members and could be included in a re-designed COMET project. It would also be undertaken in cooperation with and as a complement to the modernization programme. For example, the modernization manager, Mr. Asshton Boggs, and other knowledgeable people the team spoke with, identified leader development, the legal framework of the JCF, accountability, financial management and records management as all in need of significant development/reform. These topics along with the planning documents mentioned below will form the basis for work plan development that is an important component of the Reform Leader concept.

The team anticipates that these and other associated issues will be discussed at length in the forthcoming JCF strategic review and we fully support the concept that these areas are vital to community policing.

Briefly this will involve:
· Written commitment of understanding and cooperation with the JCF
· Development of a criteria to select “Reform Leaders Class #1” from all levels of the organization
· Placing those identified in the same leadership seminar with special attention devoted to change management
· Immediately after the seminar, a facilitated planning process is conducted using existing plans, the Community Policing Manual and other relevant materials such as the forthcoming Strategic Management Study to form the process framework
· Facilitating translation of strategic goals and objectives into work plans for each member of Reform Leader Class #1
· Upon completion of the work plans, each member of the class is immediately transferred to the pre-designated position where they can implement their work plan
· Frequent facilitated meetings are held for the Reform Leaders to reinforce progress, discuss problems, generate solutions and provide moral support
· After 6-12 months Reform Leader Class #2 is identified and merged into the annual planning/transfer/implementation process
· The process is continued until the number of Reform Leaders is sufficient to tip the JCF from its current state into a reform state. Planning and transfer processes can then be modified to fit a reformed, learning organization.

Track Two: Community Policing Expansion
This track is underway and gaining momentum. Under new leadership, the JCF has developed a plan and assigned two Community Safety Officers to each of the 19 police divisions. Public Education and support for Parish Safety Committees are other priorities. Training is also a major part of the plan.

The push for reform in the JCF is beginning and the COMET project will be able to look for opportunities to invest in the process. One such opportunity could be to support the group of 40 Crime Prevention Officers described earlier in this report. There are and will continue to be basic needs for this unit and others that, if addressed, could help transform them into core change agents for the JCF. Reform Leaders could be recruited from these units and if it becomes clear that the unit is supported and is a career development opportunity, its’ importance and influence will rapidly rise.

Another CBP support opportunity could be found in the current Grants Pen Station Project. To help Grants Pen advance toward fulfilling its promise, several actions could be taken. Retraining for the currently assigned personnel has been requested by the JCF Division Commander and is already being considered as part of the ongoing COMET project. This training could take advantage of the new JCF Community Policing Manual and operational lessons learned at Grants Pen. One lesson seems consistent among Flankers, Browns Town (Dunkirk), and Grants Pen: the way the police treat the citizens in any neighbourhood is key to the success of any police initiative. Jamaicans, like people in other countries, react in a very positive way to respectful treatment by the police. Another factor involves the Grants Pen Station Manual (written as part of the CPI pilot project) that, for a number of reasons, was never implemented. Some of the material in this manual speaks directly to the institutional problems within the JCF discussed elsewhere in this assessment. Incorporating these management concepts into JCF materials, such as the next version of the Community Policing Manual could be another way to leverage the Grants Pen experience for a positive outcome. The most direct involvement for Grants Pen could put the station in the role of a test site for the new manual and procedures. Success would not depend on the station facility but on the actions of the staff.

While it is certainly not the only ingredient, training is one of the basics of success in law enforcement. Training must be based on policy. Policy is based on the law and the organization’s values. Training will not be effective unless the organization supports it through process, structure and procedure. The most important component is supervision and a culture that rewards those who follow policy and training.

The training described above must be built on the documents and policies of the JCF. So, consultation with the JCF throughout the development of the new training will be required. Members from all ranks in the affected area should attend the training and then continue in their assignment for a significant period of time (two to three years) before being eligible for transfer. Ideally, supervisors should be trained separately for a portion of the course to emphasize the need for active oversight of field officers. With these conditions in place, the likelihood of potential improvements being realized is much greater.

This entire process could benefit greatly from two types of technical assistance to the JCF. One type of technical assistance will involve fielding short term regional and international specialists to provide expertise in specific areas (e.g. training development and manual revision) required to support the JCF’s CBP roll-out. The other type of technical assistance will involve building a cadre of local CBP specialists who can provide formal technical support and advisory services to police stations, divisions and communities implementing CBP. These specialists/advisors will report operationally to the ACP Community Safety. Presence of the appropriate mix of technical assistance would tie the process together and ensure coordination with wider CBP expansion and modernization efforts.

The criteria for the regional and international specialists should be developed specific to the desired needs of the JCF. No one should be hired for this position without the consent of the JCF executive staff and a detailed interview.

CBP Implementation Team
It is recommended that COMET maintain regular and detailed review of the project impacts by participating in the CBP Implementation Team referenced above. Oversight and evaluation on an ongoing basis through this mechanism will ensure full coordination between the two tracks with the intent to achieve maximum positive effect. The CBP Implementation Team could be responsible for facilitating implementation of policy, training, oversight, evaluation and other important components of the Commissioner’s CBP goal. The CBP Implementation Team would report directly to the Commissioner on a regular basis through its chair that would likely be the ACP for Community Safety.

Membership of the CBP Implementation Team would include appropriate JCF staff, the Ministry of National Security, the Social Development Commission, and relevant donor representation. A key objective of this arrangement is the coordination between the GOJ drivers and donor agencies supporting CBP implementation. The team would inform strategic decisions and support implementation. Initial focus will have to be placed at both the macro and micro level. As the roll-out process (supported by various projects) matures, the intent is that the efforts at the macro level will begin to naturally flow through the improved organizational pathways to the micro level. In addition, it is possible that this CBP Implementation Team could provide a forum for input from the non-governmental community regarding the CBP process. This may occur via a subcommittee process or regular membership by citizens.

It must be emphasized that the CBP Implementation Team is not a staff support function and must have members with authority and responsibility conveyed from the Commissioner and other entities to direct action that will accomplish goals established for the roll-out of CBP.

V. Monitoring and Evaluation of CBP

This part of the report highlights the importance of monitoring and evaluation in assessing the effectiveness of CBP.

Lessons Learned

There is a recognized need within the JCF and amongst partner agencies for effective monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of CBP.

Recommendations

Carry out a base-line assessment of crime, policing and community relations in Jamaica.
Institute a process of monitoring and evaluation of CBP over at least a three year period.
Consider enhancing impact of monitoring and evaluation process by using appropriate spatial analysis tools, i.e., GPS and GIS technologies.


The process of monitoring and evaluating CBP serves as a foundation for increasing the effectiveness and impact of the programme. Reviewing the process of monitoring and evaluation one would need to examine previous activities related to measuring the impact of CBP.
The Ministry of National Security in its National Security Strategy identifies the need to develop benchmarks and indicators for CBP. The JCF Corporate Strategy outlines the CBP strategy and outlines measures to assess progress. This corporate strategy outlines the following measuring progress:

Regular monitoring of the level of fear of Crime among citizens in the communities;
Use of surveys at police stations to measure the levels of satisfaction with JCF services;
By an upturn in the reporting of incidents (including crime in the short term) as a result of increasing public confidence;
In the longer term we will measure the expected decrease in crime, disorder and other incidents.

As part of the PERF project the Grants Pen Station Manual in 2006 outlined benchmarks and measures that could be used to demonstrate progress towards achieving benchmarking goals. The benchmarks included:
Reduction of Crime and Disorder
Reduction in the Fear of Crime
Increased Trust in the Police
Decreased Deportee Problem
Increased Traffic Safety
Measurement and Documentation
Personnel Measurements

These benchmarks were to be monitored via 47 indicators or measures outlined in the Grants Pen Station manual. There was no report seen where the benchmarks had been measured for the project. The manual was produced towards the end the contract and as stated earlier in this assessment report, “An attempt was made to establish baseline data on the attitudes of the residents of the community to the police. Focus groups were established for this purpose with the outcome that, while good qualitative data were generated that described the major concerns of the people and the root causes of the distrust and lack of confidence in the police, there was a general lack of rigor in establishing these baseline data. No measurements were taken.”

The Community Safety and Security Branch of the Jamaica Constabulary Force in January2008
Produced “Manual for Community Policing Services Delivery.” The Manual has outlined measures for officer performance as listed below:

1. Number of serious crimes,
2. Level of disorder in neighborhood (Social disorder such as open drug sales, panhandlers, runaways, addicts, homeless, truants, curfew violations, prostitution, homeless, main streamed mental patients, unlicensed peddlers, gambling, loitering, unsupervised youngsters, youth gangs etc.; Physical disorder such as graffiti, abandoned cars and buildings, litter, etc.)
3. Number and type of calls for service – number and type, monthly and annual trends. When Community Policing is in effect, calls for service normally increase since people turn more to the police to help solve their problems.
4. Quantifiable activities - number of community meetings, newsletters, organizing events, telephone calls made and their type, speeches, home an business visits, personal and media contacts, other outreach.
5. Anti drug (Targeted Initiative) – e.g. holding events in spaces where drugs would normally be sold or used, to create disruption.
6. Other Targeted Initiatives – e.g. taking steps to address specific problems such as truancy, domestic abuse, noise, loitering, etc)
7. Special groups – proactive initiatives aimed at helping special and disadvantaged groups and noting when specific support was given.
8. Networking – number and types of contacts with citizens and other agencies including businesses.
9. Referrals – number and type of referrals of persons in need of special services, number and type of agency.
10. Intelligence gathering and information sharing – number of times information was collected and used to solve crimes, number of times information was shared with department, amount of information gathered about a particular crime or drug problem.
11. Innovation – documented accounts of innovative strategies and techniques.
12. Teamwork – if jobs were handled in teams the evaluation should reflect the number of contacts, number of hours and the outcomes.
13. Solicitation of resources – number and kinds of donations from several sources.
14. Human Resources
15. Adoption/ Roll out by Division
16. Police Citizens Relations

Please note that 14, 15 and 16 above relate to the Community Policing Index in the Community Policing Manual.

Other parameters
o Administrative duties – attendance, promptness, courtesy to public and colleagues, cooperation with department.
o Professional improvement – participation in in-service training, attendance at other training sessions.
o Use of technology – computer, radio.

Based on an assessment of existing documents on benchmarking and reviewing the findings of this assessment the following potential categories of benchmarks for CBP within the JCF are proposed: (See Table below and Annex 4.)

Level of Crime
Perception of Safety
Police Response to Reported Crime
Police - Community Relationship
Communication
Governance Structures/External Linkages
Monitoring and Evaluation
Community-Based Policing Policies
Youth Engagement
Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice
Infrastructure Upgrading

As part of the process, targets for crime reduction would be established at the community level and indicators refined based on assumptions and the environment (influential factors) in which the programme was operating. The progress and success of CBP would be based on an evaluation of the existing situation as determined by a baseline assessment (See Annex 5.) The programme needs to be guided by clearly defined indicators and benchmarks discussed with the police at all ranks and with the relevant stakeholders prior to dissemination. Once set, progress towards these targets indicators and benchmarks should be reviewed on a regular basis. Weekly assessment of performance benchmarks at station level would feed into monthly or quarterly reviews at the divisional level. Annual or biannual reviews at the national level would support and guide the evaluation process.

The M&E process should have the results of a baseline assessment to be able to measure progress. The routine data collection systems within the JCF based on the data collection forms in the Community Policing Manual 2008 would need to be implemented. Training programmes in data use in the monitoring and planning of programmes would need to be held. M&E support staff would need to be available to the JCF to support this process.

The monitoring and evaluation process should incorporate the use of quantitative and qualitative data and, local surveys and where possible, rapid assessment methodologies. To date, the JCF (the Community Policing Index), Grants Pen Station (the Station Manual), The Community Policing Manual and the Jamaica Social Policy Evaluation/ Social Development Commission (the Police/Youth Relationship Score Card) have evaluated tools which are appropriate for local use. Reviews of routine data, local and special reports, use of rapid assessment tools, crime victimization surveys, and the JCF Community Policing Manual will assist in the process of carrying out these assessments. Initial work has been done by the JCF and the Kingston Western Crime Observatory which show the use of spatial analysis of crime as a powerful crime fighting and crime prevention tool.

Prerequisites for successful assessments
Assessments and reviews should include community and stakeholder inputs where possible and should have a short action oriented feedback process identified. The process of recognition for effective CBP should be incorporated at all levels of the monitoring and evaluation process within the JCF. Budget allocations for M&E including resources for baseline assessment and periodic evaluations should be included in annual and long term strategic plans.

Prerequisites for successful engagement of the community in CBP
For CBP to have an impact and maintain a sustained reduction in crime a clearly defined and funded community involvement plan must be in place. Following the outline of potential benchmarks a draft plan with components, suggested strategies and potential partners needs to be developed. An example is outlined in Annex 1V. Plans, however, need to be individualized based on an assessment of the community, potential entry points, interests of the community and resources available for community involvement. These activities can be carried out by external agencies eg COMET and should build bridges to existing social services.

Potential categories of benchmarks for COMET to monitor include:
Police - Community Relationship
Communication
Governance Structures/External Linkages
Monitoring and Evaluation
Community-Based Policing Policies

Youth Engagement
Governance structures with community Leadership
Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice
Infrastructure upgrading

Currently, the JCF’s information system focuses primarily on recording levels of crime. In order to accurately measure progress in community policing, the sensitivity and specificity of the current information system must be improved. Some areas for development include the classification of incidents, time and timeliness of reporting, locations where crimes occur, and interventions (e.g. deployments, effectiveness, response time). Routine and special analyses need to be performed on the data and linked back to management decisions and service delivery. Strengthening the use of technology such as GIS and GPS can improve the information system and its relevance to CBP.

The area of police community relationships has to be monitored. The JASPEV-SDC scorecard can be used to measure police-youth relationships at the local level. A companion scorecard to measure police assessment of community relations needs to be developed. This information would be supported by data from other surveys such as crime victimization surveys and public opinion and human rights survey.

Measuring CBP Progress and Success

Building the JCF capacity to monitor and evaluate progress/success of CBP
The role of COMET in monitoring and evaluating progress /success of CBP

The baseline assessment would be carried out by external contractors and the data made available to the JCF and its partners for use in planning and evaluation of CBP.

There would need to be training in program management and in the use and analysis of data for M&E. It would be necessary to strengthen routine data collection systems to support the JCF’s M&E function. The COMET Project should identify technical assistance to build the JCF’s capacity at the Station, Division, Branch and National levels (e.g. Statistics Unit) to carry out its M&E functions.

Please See Annex IV For Scope of Work for Community Baseline Assessment


Table 2

Proposed Benchmarks

Indicators
(Need to be SMART)
CBP Performance Criteria (PC)Outcomes
USAID
Standard Indicators
JCF
COMET
Level of Crime

Change in the ratio of violent to property crimes
PC 1 &2

X


Increase in reported crime
PC 3

X


Increase in clearance rate
PC10

X

Perception of Safety

Reduction of fear of crime


X
X

Increase in community policing activities
PC 4
1.14
X
X

Crime Prevention Committees (CPCs)


X
X

Community Security Plans (CSPs)
PC 5 & 6

X
X
Police Response to Reported Crime

Response Time
PC4

X


Public Satisfaction



X
Police - Community Relationship

Community rating of police
PC 17
1.14

X

Community based activities
PC 8 & 9


X

Police relationship with local government agencies,
PC 8


X

Police rating of Community
PC 17

X

Communication

Public meetings
P C 4

X
X

Newsletters
P C 4


X

Consultations



X
Linkages with Governance Structures Internal and external stakeholder


Knowledge of governance structures (GS)
PC 8
2.23
X
X

Linkages of CBP with GS
PC 9


X

Partnerships including Public-private partnerships
PC 14


X

Strengthen community governance structures linked to CBP

2.23
2.41

X
Community-Based Policing Policies


Implementation
PC 16

X
X

Posts/Positions


X
X

Training Programme
PC 15

X
X

Resource allocation


X

Youth Engagement

Unattached youths involved in structured activities with life skills, job placement and micro enterprise programmes with CBP involved
PC 5, 6 &7
1.35
3.21
4.63
4.73
X
X
Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice

Establish reconciliation services at the community level

1.61
1.62

X
Infrastructure upgrading

Community infrastructure upgrade to facilitate crime reduction
PC 2
1.11

X


ANNEXES

Annex I: Coordination with Donors and the Private Sector

This section of the report acknowledges the significant support in terms of finance, resources and technical assistance that have been obtained from the international donor community and the private sector in Jamaica. It is important that this support be channeled and directed effectively in support of CBP.

Lessons Learned:

There is strong support amongst the international donor community for CBP.
As evidenced by Grants Pen, the private sector can make a significant contribution to the development of CBP.
It is important that there is clear understanding by all parties of roles and responsibilities in CBP partnerships.

Recommendations:

Continue to build on interest expressed by the international donor community to coordinate efforts on CBP and to expand collaboration with individual donors, for example through DFID’s JCF modernization programme, which can provide valuable assistance in legal and policy reform.
Pursue crime prevention public-private alliances to increase youth employment and school completion and decrease crime and violence.
Improve the development impact of public-private alliances by creating strong governance structures from the outset.

Organizations external to the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) influence policy and practice within the JCF, organizations that are current or potential partners for USAID as it works to implement CBP within the JCF. For USAID, it is currently an excellent environment for coordinating and collaborating with partners in the donor community and in the private sector.



International Donors

The international donor community in Jamaica recently agreed to coordinate more closely on the JCF-led roll out of CBP and appears to be thinking similarly about the importance of CBP.

Through DFID, the UK has supported a JCF modernization programme (ending in July 2008). The programme’s 2005 - 2008 strategy has a focus on community policing. However, until recently DFID spent most of this budget on other aspects of JCF modernization. The UK, GoJ, and the Jamaican business community have sponsored a police officer from abroad to serve at the Assistant Commissioner level and drive forward the CBP and community safety agenda. However, this position ends in May 2009 and the availability of future funding is unknown. DFID also provided funding to support the Social Development Commission’s (SDC) complementary work in community policing; this funding expires in March 2008 and it is not clear if it will be renewed. If future funding for the JCF modernization programme is available, DFID could provide valuable assistance to the JCF Commissioner in modifying personnel policies or relevant laws to allow appropriate disciplinary, accountability, promotion, and transfer checks and balances. These reforms will be essential to gaining appropriate management control of the JCF. In addition, the DFID coordinator for the Modernization Programme has shown initial interest in the Reform Leaders approach outlined in Section IV.

The UNDP has recently assumed a coordinating role with other donor partners including USAID, DFID, and the European Union. While this is at early stages of development there appears to be strong interest in community policing and the potential to secure significant resources. EU budget support could provide resources for CBP, as it can be used by the GoJ to support the implementation of GoJ policies related to security (including community policing).

USAID is currently coordinating closely with the World Bank by co-locating new COMET interventions in two communities where the World Bank is initiating its Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project.

The Jamaican and International Private Sectors

The private sector in Jamaica shows varying degrees of commitment to community investment and public-private partnerships. The Jamaican Chamber of Commerce (JCC) and the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), in addition to individual companies such as Sandals, LASCO and Grace Kennedy Co, have demonstrated an on-going commitment to social and economic development in Jamaica. The JCC operates a learning center in downtown Kingston, providing youth a safe place to be after school. AMCHAM has taken a lead role in the development of community policing in Grants Pen, has an ongoing and keen interest in the further progression of the current Grants Pen project, and has secured significant resources to support its interests; the Jamaican private sector and AMCHAM members, in addition to the Government of Jamaica, funded the model police station in Grants Pen, providing both cash and in-kind resources for its construction. AMCHAM supported an initial study by PERF on crime and violence in Kingston, with detailed recommendations to decrease the incidence of violent crimes.

While this assessment did not survey the full range of the private sector’s community development activities in Jamaica, the reasons why the private sector chooses to be involved in development range from the purely philanthropic (e.g. to improve public relations) to the desire to cultivate social capital in the communities they work in (e.g. to create a safe, secure operating environment for their business or to provide themselves with skilled staff). In discussions with AMCHAM members, poor security, and its effect on the business climate, was a primary concern and appeared to motivate business to collaborate in community safety and community development activities, providing a starting point for potential public-private alliances with the Government of Jamaica and the donor community.

The purpose of a public-private alliance is to deliver greater development impact through the combined strengths of multiple partners. The fundamental differences between public and private organizations provide comparative advantages that partnerships can draw upon to mutual benefit. The unique resources of the private sector can be invaluable in reducing crime and violence, whether they are providing financial resources for infrastructure or community development programmes, political influence, access to in-house training, mentorship, and entrepreneurial skills for youth, or other forms of knowledge and services. For example, high levels of youth unemployment and insufficient access to education and economic opportunities exacerbate crime and violence. In Jamaica, public-private partnerships can provide youth with access to private sector jobs, training, and entrepreneurial skills while also providing the private sector partners with tangible benefits like qualified employees and safer streets. Existing investments by the COMET project can leverage private sector resources (funding, jobs, mentoring, skills training, etc.)

However, the fundamental differences between the public and private sectors can also lead to disagreement, which makes strong governing structures, MOUs or Letters of Intent essential before beginning a partnership. Defining goals and objectives, partner roles and responsibilities, communication and decision-making processes, and accountability is essential to the success of a partnership, and further helps to manage expectations from the outset.

Annex II: Individuals and Organizations Consulted


United States Government
Robert Birkenes, Director, Program Office, USAID/Jamaica
James Burroughs, Democracy and Governance Office, USAID/Jamaica
James Harmon, Deputy Mission Director, USAID/Jamaica
Karen Hilliard, Ph.D., Mission Director, USAID/Jamaica
Ken Lyvers, Director, Office of Sustainable Development, USAID/Jamaica
Sasha Parke, Democracy and Governance Office, USAID/Jamaica
John Wright, Program Officer, USAID/Jamaica

Government of Jamaica
Delroy Chuck, Speaker of the House of Parliament
Winston Ennis, Councillor, Waterloo Division
Ishia Johnson, Campaign Manager for Sophia Rhone, Barbican Division
Sophia Rhone, Councillor, Barbican Division
Vivian E. Brown, Senior Director, Modernization Initiatives and Special Projects, Ministry of
National Security
Dr. Deon Kerr, Director of Research, Ministry of National Security
Tasha Nembhard, Project Assistant, Ministry of National Security
Inspector Stephanie Lindsay Clarke, Community Safety Branch, Constant Spring Police, JCF
ACP Novelette Grant, Professional Standards Branch, HQ, JCF
Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin, Commissioner of Police
Superintendent Anthony Morris, Commanding Officer St. Andrew North, JCF
DSP Beau Rigabie, Acting Commander, Grants Pen Police Station, JCF

Civil Society
Youth Focus Group, Grants Pen
Youth Focus Group, Flanker
Women Focus Group, Flanker
Community Group, Browns Town (Dunkirk)

Omar Frith, Treasurer, Grants Pen Community Policing Consultative Committee
Janet Henry, Community Representative, Grants Pen
Alton James, President, Triumph Unity Sports Club Benevolent Society
Horace Levy, Peace Management Initiative
Marilyn McIntosh-Nash, Community Organizer, Flanker
Garfield McDonald, Treasurer/Secretary, Grants Pen Community Policing Consultative
Committee
Pastor Ian Muirhead, Chairman, Grants Pen Community Policing Consultative Committee
Trevor Weston, Acadia Citizens Association
Clarice Campbell, Caretaker, Waterloo Division
Hugh Thompson, Caretaker, North East St. Andrew
Nancy Anderson, Independent Jamaican Council for Human Rights
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum
Ann Astwood, Cable and Wireless Foundation Jamaica, AMCHAM member
Marjorie Borough, Stewart’s Auto Sales Ltd.
Margaret Croskery, Total Travel, AMCHAM member
Aubrey Deere, National Health Fund
Francis Kennedy, 2nd Vice-President, Jamaica Chamber of Commerce
Rose Marie Lee, National Health Fund
Robert MacMillan, Advertising Executive, AMCHAM member
Audrey Marks, CEO, Paymaster, AMCHAM member
Peter Moses, Citibank, AMCHAM member
Diana Stewart, Stewart’s Auto Sales Ltd., Vice-President AMCHAM
Sameer Younis, Jamaica Chamber of Commerce


International Donor Community
Assheton J. Bogg, Reform and Modernization Program Manager, HQ, JCF


Annex III: Literature Review

Democracy International. Evaluation and Lessons Learned: Improved Citizen Security and Participation in Democratic Processes. June 2005.

Democracy International. Evaluation and Lessons Learned: Peace and Prosperity Project. June 2005.

Harriott, Anthony. A Critical Review of the PERF Report (2001) on Crime and the Reduction of Murders in Jamaica. March 2001.

Jamaicans for Justice. Pattern of Impunity: A Report on Jamaica’s Investigation and Prosecution of Deaths at the Hands of Agents of the State. Presented to Inter American Commission on Human Rights.

Jamaicans for Justice. Survey of 1008 Residents of Jamaica. November 2007.

JCF, Community Safety and Security Branch. Manual for Community Policing Services
Delivery. October, 2007.

PERF. Final Project Report for USAID Cooperative Agreement #532-A-00-05-00130-00. 28 June 2006.
PERF. Violent Crime and Murder Reduction in Kingston. January 2001.
PERF and COMET Work plans and quarterly reports (obtained from USAID)

USAID. Crime, Gangs, and Violence: An Assessment of Community-Oriented Policing in Grants Pen and Central Village, Jamaica. December 2006.

USAID. Notes of Community Policing Workshop. 11 December, 2007.

JASPEV Police Community Relations Scorecard

Police Citizen Relationships in Grants Pen, by Ian Boxill

Social Ecology and Patterns in Grants Pen, Flanker, Central Village: Internship papers by UWI and University of Florida interns

Annex IV: Community Based Policing Baseline Assessment

Terms of Reference
Provision of research skills with respect to carrying out a baseline assessment for Community Based Policing


1. Background

Community policing has been adopted as a force-wide philosophy in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the roll-out process has started with training and the identification of participating police stations within all nineteen (19) police divisions in Jamaica. This is a departure from the implementation through isolated pilot and community level interventions. This new approach seeks to address issues of sustainability, normalize successful pilot interventions, and integrate existing ad-hoc community safety initiatives.

There are a number of institutional and policy constraints that impede the efficient roll-out of community policing. There is currently no overarching Community Safety Strategy that delineates the roles and functions of the various stakeholders. There is also no clear indication of the resource requirements for the community policing effort. The buy-in and commitment of various partners has been uneven and there is a need to build consensus around a common goal. There are also significant gaps in knowledge regarding stakeholders’ understanding and expectations about community policing and wider community safety issues.

Exciting opportunities and encouraging lessons abound that provide the framework for advancing the community safety goals of the JCF. The JCF has taken clear leadership for community policing and has begun the process of institutionalizing the method.


2. Consultancy Objectives:

2.1 To carry out a baseline assessment for CBP. This exercise is to provide data for strengthening the technical, supervisory and policy capacities for guiding the CBP project development process;

2.2 Provide technical, programmatic, training and policy advice re CBP as a result of the findings of the baseline assessment, to the JCF especially the Community Based policing team and any other parties as may be required;

2.3.1. Identify the data for targets, indicators and benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of CBP.

2.3.2. Develop an overall evaluation formats with simple evaluation tools to be used in an evaluation framework for CBP to be used a different levels of the JCF.

2.3.3. Provide data from the baseline results relevant to evaluating CBP at the community, divisional and national level.


3. Characteristics of the Consultancy

3.1 Type of Consultancy: Group
3.2 Duration: The consultancy would be for a 6 week period commencing April 1, 2008 and should be completed by 15 May, 2008
3.3 Qualifications: The group should consist of a consultant should possess at least a MSc degree in public health or epidemiology, a statistician, researchers and data collectors. The group will be selected against the following criteria:
(i) Extensive knowledge and expertise in the survey and evaluation process;
(ii). Demonstrated experience in the successful completion of a representative population survey in Jamaica;
(iii) Excellent organizational, logistic, planning, initiating and coordinating skills with solid problem solving capacities;
(iv) Demonstrated skills in survey design, development and execution of population based surveys;
(v) Thorough knowledge and experience in baseline assessment;
(vi) Experience in carrying out surveys using both quantitative and qualitative methodology;
(vii) Exceptional ability to analyze and communicate effectively and authoritatively at all levels of government, private sector, non-government sector and at the community level;
(viii) Excellent quantitative and qualitative skills. Ability to communicate in oral and written format and posses excellent interpersonal relationship skills.


4. Responsibilities/Activities

The consultant, acting on behalf of the Project team and in collaboration and consultation with
the JCF –CBP division, will undertake the following:

4.1 Prepare research plan with evaluation tools for submission to the Project team on the 5th working day of consultancy;
4.2 Recruit, train relevant staff to carry out the baseline study. Ensure that all tolls used are culturally and technically appropriate for obtaining the required baseline data;
4.3 Analyze data outputs, reports and other relevant outputs of the consultancy and provide written comments and recommendations for improvement;
4.4 Assess and identify any constraints and /or bottlenecks in the assessment development process and initiate or propose as appropriate actions for solution;

4.5 Participate in meetings of the project team and provide advice and prepare written reports on progress;
4.6 Prepare final report documenting technical and data results and findings at the Community, divisional and national level;
4.7 Provide any other duties as may be considered relevant.


5. Main Outputs

The group will be responsible for all deliverables. All deliverables will be made in keeping with the schedule in the contract and work plan;

5.1 A work plan defining activities, their chronology as well as the methodology should be delivered within two weeks of signing of the contract;
5.2 Progress reports including a mid-term report and a final report on the achievement of the consultancy;
5.3 The final report should document the findings of the study and provide data for establishing targets, indicators and benchmarks at a national, divisional and community level.
5.4 The group will deliver both hard and electronic copies of all reports and documents to the JCF and the project team for circulation.

6. Supervision and Coordination

The group will work under the general direction and supervision of the ACP Community Safety and the Policy and Research Division of the JCF. However, the consultant will report and work on a weekly basis in consultation with and under the direct supervision of the project team.
Annex V: CBP Lessons Learned Matrix




Jamaica-Community-Based Policing Lessons Learned Matrix
US
COM
JCF
Other

Analysis of CBP: Community Relations and Lessons Learned in Grants Pen

1
Grants Pen is not a "model" in terms of success or replicability
X
X
X
X
2
Grants Pen is a good example of private sector commitment to CBP
X
X
X
X
3
Good preparatory work was done and elements of CBP were implemented in Grants Pen which provide valuable information and learning
X
X
X

4
Grants Pen does not represent a fully developed style of CBP.
X
X
X
X
5
Decentralization is normally a component of successful community policing. However, in the Grants Pen experiment. stakeholder influence over management decisions was seen as subverting normal JCF channels


X

6
The role of stakeholders in the future JCF community policing efforts must be clearly defined and new lines of authority only created with the JCF and in accordance with standard management practices.


X
X
7
Unless specialized, central police units are properly trained and supervised closely their standard tactics will damage positive police-community relationships and alienate the community. Community policing style and tactics are not just for some officers. The entire JCF must apply them. Specialized teams and task forces can implement community policing tactics also.


X

8
Trust- building is a difficult process that requires consistent effort on the part of the police to effectively manage the problem of corruption and to reliably protect citizens from criminal victimization. CBP projects should be accompanied by the development of dedicated channels by which the citizens in each community are able to help control corruption in the local police that serve them


X
X
9
New personalities that bring a new policing style to a neighborhood will have a window of trust building opportunity. The new style must persist for some time[6] before old frames of reference are broken and a new model of police behavior is created


X



10
Some gains have been made in creating a new relationship between police and citizens. In order to consolidate this progress, citizens must move from partnership into problem solving.

X
X
X
11
Peace making in violent neighbourhoods is progress. It does not, however, remove or weaken criminal groups and, in some instances, may strengthen them. Peace-making can create operational space for social crime prevention but does not mean that neighbourhood crime has been successfully controlled


X
X
12
Policing transformation should include the following at a minimum: Altering the structure of criminal offending in the community from a high violence pattern to a more “normal” pattern. Ending the existence of political and gang-enforced borders. Breaking or at least eroding the code of silence in the communities. Ending citizen vigilantism. Maintaining the above for at least a period of 3 years.
X
X
X
X
13
Care must be taken to ensure that a model is, in fact, sustainable. Any model project should seek to adjust the requirements of the project to the larger realities. Innovative sustainable solutions must be the goal of any model project.

X
X

14
Distilling the experiences of Jamaica and other countries in the region is important to the successful roll out of CBP in Jamaica


X
X
JCF ANALYSIS

15

Dramatic improvements in police community relations can take root over a relatively short time of police – citizen attitudes changing


X
X
16
While there is evidence of CBP initiatives, these have tended to be limited with no widespread implementation.


X

17
There are leadership & accountability issues within the JCF which inhibit the ability to transform the organisation towards CBP


X

18
CBP must work with other social interventions and community programmes to successfully address social problems.


X
X
19
Lack of clear policy support and direction is an issue to be addressed.



X
20
Lack of resources for CBP is a strong inhibitor of transformation to CBP


X
X
21
The organizational capacity of the JCF requires to be significantly enhanced in order to deliver a modern CBP service.


X
X
22
Corporate communications, both internal and internal, are essential to the effective implementation of CBP

X
X
X
23
The COMET project could support the development of a reform leaders’ programme.

X



24
The lessons learned and best practices from the CPI experience should be mainstreamed into the roll out process. Future technical assistance to stations participating in the roll out, including Grants Pen, should be provided through the Divisions as per JCF policy. Technical assistance will include incorporation of a revised Station Manual into the CP Manual; training and advisory services.

X


MONOTORING AND EVALUATION

25

There is a recognized need within the JCF and amongst partner agencies for effective monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of CBP.
X
X
X
X
COORDINATION WITH DONORS AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS

26
There is strong support amongst the international donor community for CBP.
X

X
X
27
As evidenced by Grants Pen, the private sector can make a significant contribution to the development of CBP


X
X
28
It is important that there is clear understanding by all parties of roles and responsibilities in CBP partnerships
X
X
X
X








Annex VI: Recommendations Matrix




Actor

Recommendations Matrix
USAID
COMET
JCF
OTHER

ANALYSIS OF CBP: COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN GRANTS PEN


1
CBP should be developed throughout Jamaica in an incremental way using innovation and creativity.
X

X

2
Manage expectations in Grants Pen by adjusting the requirements of the COMET project to the larger national realities (ie. JCF management, resource constraints, etc)
X
X
X

3
Continue to inform the communities of their role in the process and to include them in decision-making as appropriate for that role.
X
X
X
X
4
Develop training materials based on lessons learned and best practices in CBP and/or community involvement from the Jamaican experience (Grants Pen, Gold Street, Flanker, Browns Town (Dunkirk), etc.) that can be used to mainstream CBP.

X
X

5
Accompany any further roll out of CBP with efforts to ensure that procedures or protocols governing the operation of specialized, central (i.e., non-Grants Pen) units in the communities are followed.

X
X


JCF ANALYSIS

6
To strengthen the implementation of CBP within the JCF, this assessment recommends a two-track process. One addressing organizational development and the other operational capabilities needed to develop CBP.
X
X
X
X
7
Create a CBP Implementation Team, chaired by the Assistant Commissioner, charged with the CBP Expansion, with team members from the Ministry of National Security, the JCF, other relevant agencies and the COMET project. It would use their combined capacities to adjust resources, overcome obstacles to the process and aid in implementation.

X
X
X
8
The JCF should work in partnership with donor agencies and other social agencies to progress CBP

X
X
X
9
Clear policy guidelines should be provided to support the development of CBP


X

10
Implement an effective corporate communications strategy in support of CBP


X

11
The COMET project should support the development of a reform leaders’ programme.

X
X

12
The lessons learned and best practices from the CPI experience should be mainstreamed into the roll out process. Future technical assistance to stations participating in the roll out, including Grants Pen, should be provided through the Divisions as per JCF policy. Technical assistance will include incorporation of a revised Station Manual into the CP Manual; training and advisory services.


X
X


MONITORING & EVALUATION

13
Carry out a base-line assessment of crime, policing and community relations in Jamaica.
X
X

X
14
Institute a process of monitoring and evaluation of CBP over at least a three year period
X
X
X

15
Consider enhancing impact of monitoring and evaluation process by using appropriate spatial analysis tools, i.e., GPS and GIS technologies
X
X

X

COORDINATION WITH DONORS & THE PRIVATE SECTOR

16
Continue to build on interest expressed by the larger donor community to coordinate efforts on CBP and to expand collaboration with individual donors, for example through DFID’s JCF modernization programme, which can provide valuable assistance in legal and policy reform.
X
X
X
X
17
Pursue crime prevention public-private alliances to increase youth employment and school completion and decrease crime and violence.
X
X
X
X
18
Improve the development impact of public-private alliances by creating strong governance structures from the outset.
X


Private Sector

Annex VII: CBP Assessment Terms of Reference



Statement of Work
For
Community Policing Assessment
January 2008



A. Purpose

The purpose of the Assessment is to inform two broad areas of restructuring for the USAID Community Empowerment and Transformation (COMET) Project:

Technical Assistance for the Jamaica Constabulary Force’s roll-out of Community Policing; and
Forward Planning for community policing in Grants Pen.

The Assessment will also inform JCF’s review and further refinement of the JCF’s comprehensive Community Policing Implementation Strategy.

B. Background

Community policing has been adopted as a force-wide philosophy in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the roll-out process has started with training and the identification of participating police stations within all nineteen (19) police divisions in Jamaica. This is a departure from the implementation through isolated pilot and community level interventions. This new approach seeks to address issues of sustainability, normalize successful pilot interventions, and integrate existing ad-hoc community safety initiatives.

There are a number of institutional and policy constraints that impede the efficient roll-out of community policing. There is a need to review and further refine the JCF’s overarching Community Policing Implementation Strategy that delineates the roles and functions of the various stakeholders and that indicates priorities and resource requirements for the community policing effort. The buy-in and commitment of various partners has therefore been uneven and there is a need to build consensus around a common goal. There are also significant gaps in knowledge regarding stakeholders’ understanding and expectations about community policing and wider community safety issues.

Exciting opportunities and encouraging lessons abound that provide the framework for advancing the community safety goals of the JCF. The JCF has taken clear leadership for community policing and has begun the process of institutionalizing the concept of community policing. A Community Policing Manual has been developed that standardizes community policing principles and practices island wide, and divisional primacy has been established for the management of community policing. The JCF is currently reviewing the management structure for policing in Grants Pen and there are lessons to be learned from the Grants Pen pilot community policing effort that can inform the broad implementation strategy. The experience in implementing the USAID Community Empowerment and Transformation (COMET) project in the last year has demonstrated that effective and sustainable change requires a more systemic approach of providing technical assistance to the JCF. The experience has also shown that technical assistance support at the divisional level is key to facilitating sustainability of community policing services at the individual community level.

A recent Community Policing Stakeholder Workshop provided the vision and framework for how various partners and stakeholders can support community policing, and validated COMET’s need to restructure it technical assistance strategy.

This assessment will identify the JCF’s capacity building needs for effectively implementing Community Policing and the role of various partners including USAID/COMET in assisting the JCF and facilitating the roll-out. The assessment will also address the support required to scale-up community policing activities in Grants Pen and ensure compatibility with the wider JCF community policing initiative.


C. Statement of Work

The assessment team will conduct fieldwork and analysis that addresses the areas described below. The assessment findings will provide USAID/Jamaica and the USAID/COMET project with general information about how its work plan can be adjusted to provide support to JCF as an institution and its roll-out of Community Policing. The assessment findings will also inform the role various other partners and donors can play in supporting the roll-out of community policing. The assessment will also articulate the key lessons that can be drawn from the Grants Pen experience to benefit future activities and indicate how to best support the JCF’s decision to scale-up and mainstream the community policing activities in Grants Pen.

Component 1: Technical Assistance for the JCF’s roll-out of Community Policing

The JCF is rolling out a Community Safety and Security Strategy, which includes Community Policing. Component 1 of the Assessment will address the questions:
What are the JCF’s capacity building needs so that it can effectively implement community policing on a sustainable basis?
Which of these needs can best be addressed by the USAID/COMET project?
What specific technical assistance, strategies and approaches should be used by the USAID/COMET project to address these needs?
How best can other partners and donors address these needs?

This will involve:
Identifying and analyzing the major policy drivers (national legal/ regulatory/budget policy, JCF level policy etc) for community policing;
Reviewing implementation of the proposed eighty-three (83) recommendations contained in the 2001 PERF Report and updating any relevant recommendations that are germane to JCF’s roll-out of CP that remain outstanding;
Identifying the JCF’s technical capacity building needs that most directly impact community policing (for example, crime scene management and evaluation and appraisal of personnel) and the most effective strategies to address them;
Identifying the needs associated with specific programs that are complementary to community policing, for example, witness protection and victim support.
Determining who the critical GOJ partners for community safety are, and their respective roles;
Identifying the constraints that impede their collaboration;
Determining how CP progress can be measured (selection of indicators and benchmarks) at the Divisional level, including the adequacy and revision (if required) of the CPI;
Develop/revise results framework and prepare the Statement of Work for TA to collect baseline data at the Divisional level (for the indicators selected) for measurement of CP progress.

Component 2: Forward Planning for Community Policing in Grants Pen

The JCF has decided to scale up and mainstream the community policing activities in Grants Pen into the divisional management and operational structure as it rolls out community policing island-wide. Component 2 of the Assessment will address the question:
How can the USAID/COMET project and the other stakeholders most effectively support the JCF in this process?

This will involve:
Assessing stakeholders’ satisfaction with community policing in Grants Pen;
Determining the factors related to success/failure of community policing in Grants Pen OTHER than USAID project assistance. For example, what factors have made a conducive or non-conducive environment for community policing in Grants Pen, such as community development resources, local leadership, community buy-in (or lack thereof), violence levels, community cohesion, role of private sector, etc.
Identifying the Grants Pen stakeholders’ original understanding and expectations of community policing;
Reviewing agreements and commitments with the GOJ and JCF regarding the JCF management of the Grants Pen Police Station;
Identifying the successes and failures of community policing in Grants Pen,
Identifying the indicators that are used by the key stakeholders and determining their appropriateness for measuring the impact of community policing country wide; and
Identifying critical areas of need at the Grants Pen station and St. Andrew North divisional levels, and the future role of the Grants Pen Police Station facility in the roll-out of community policing.
The assessment team shall:

Share its findings and recommendations with the JCF High Command and the Ministry of National Security to solicit feedback.

Conduct a Seminar to provide the findings and recommendations of the assessment to the other key stakeholders and solicit feedback.

Submit a draft report, written in English, to USAID/Jamaica within one week of concluding field work, for review and comments.

Submit a final report, written in English, to USAID/Jamaica, incorporating comments of the Mission staff, within three weeks of receiving comments from the Mission on the draft report.


D. Methods and Procedures

1. At the start of the assignment, the assessment team shall meet with the representatives of USAID/Jamaica and USAID/COMET to develop a work plan, interview list and schedule, and to schedule report-writing responsibilities.
2. The assessment team will review all relevant project documents, including project documents, quarterly reports, annual work plans, annual performance reports, consultant reports, interim evaluations and trip reports, and technical materials. These materials will be provided by USAID. Document review should be completed before initiating interviews.
3. The Assessment Team shall conduct an appropriate number of focus groups and interviews with individuals from the following groups.
(a) citizens/citizen groups;
(b) youth;
(c) local business community;
(d) the Community Policing Oversight Committee;
(e) police station personnel - including the station and divisional commanders, community policing supervisors, and rank and file police officers;
(f) GOJ/MNS and JCF policy level personnel;
(g) USAID/Jamaica management and personnel; and
(h) Staff of USAID/COMET.
(i) Other donors: IDB, EU, DFID, World Bank, CIDA.


E. Assessment Team Composition and Requirements

The proposed team shall be composed of:
· GOJ representatives:
o JCF - Community Safety and Security Branch and/or Professional Standards Branch (Team Leader)

· Three local hire contractors:
o Prof Anthony Harriott – Criminologist, Member – JCF/UWI Crime Observatory, and Head, Institute of Public Safety, UWI, Mona
o Dr. Elizabeth Ward - Member – JCF/UWI Crime Observatory and Head, Violence Prevention Alliance, Ministry of Health.

· USAID/Washington Temporary Duty:
o John Buchanan, Police Expert, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, USAID
o Roopa Karia, Latin America & Caribbean Bureau, USAID
Administrative and logistic support will be provided by the USAID/COMET project. The team will consult with resource persons and groups, including but not limited to Community Resource Organizations and USAID/COMET.

All team members must possess superior written and verbal communication skills, have familiarity with community policing and crime and violence reduction interventions, and be familiar with field research principles and techniques.

The assessment team shall have responsibility for production of the report. All team members are expected to prepare written input for the final report, noting findings and conclusions drawn from interviews, organized along the lines of the final report, to assure that all relevant information collected by all team members is included in the analysis.

USAID/Jamaica may indicate Mission staff that will participate in interviews, travel to the communities, or discuss findings and conclusions with the team at various points in the assessment process.




F. Reporting Requirements

The assessment team shall present initial findings, conclusions and recommendations in a debriefing meeting/round table discussion with the (a) JCF high command and Ministry of National Security as noted above; and (b) USAID/Jamaica staff and the USAID/COMET team.

The team shall produce a final report, which will include:
(1) Executive Summary: not to exceed five pages, summarizing major findings, conclusions, and lessons learned from the assessment.
(2) Body of the Report addressing the issues and questions listed above.
(3) Annexes: additional material should be submitted as annexes, as appropriate (e.g., scope of work, bibliography of documents reviews, list of persons interviewed, etc.)


G. Schedule of Activities

Fieldwork shall take place during January 28 – February 8, 2008. Review of written documents will be conducted before interviews. The Assessment Team leader shall prepare the field instruments for submission to USAID/Jamaica and COMET. The USAID/COMET team shall identify relevant project documents to be reviewed. Interviews will be conducted with selected individuals in the communities identified. A draft report will be submitted to USAID/Jamaica within one week of completing interviews. A final report, incorporating comments from USAID/Jamaica and COMET will be delivered within two weeks (14 days) of receiving comments on the draft report.


H. Deliverables

The USAID/Jamaica CTO and USAID/COMET Project Director will approve the deliverables.

Deliverable #1: Methodology and appropriate instrument(s), interview list, and report outline and list of critical project documents to be reviewed.

Deliverable #2: Draft report covering:
What are the JCF’s capacity building needs so that it can effectively implement Community Policing on a sustainable basis?
Which of these needs can best be addressed by COMET?
How can other partners and donors best address these needs?
How can COMET and the other stakeholders most effectively support the JCF in mainstreaming community policing activities in Grants Pen?

Deliverable #3: Final report, reflecting USAID and COMET comments provided on draft report.

Deliverable #4: Presentation seminar to provide the findings and recommendations of the assessment to all stakeholders.

[1] The fear of corruption may also reinforce centralization.
[2] These rates are computed from data provided by the Statistics Unit of the JCF. They are thus based on the definition of the area that is used by the police.
[3] Public Presentation, Assistant Commissioner of Police John McLean, January 10, 2008
[4] Derick Brinkerhoff and Ben Crosby, Managing Policy Reform, (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2002)
[5] Derick Brinkerhoff and Ben Crosby, Managing Policy Reform, (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2002)
[6] Opinions vary, however organizations are generally slow to change. Three years of consistent application of these concepts is recommended as a minimum standard before they become institutionalized.

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